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Abstract 
This thesis seeks to integrate existing scholarly frameworks of populism, resource nationalism, and 
ethno-environmentalism in order to create a comprehensive understanding of Morales and the MAS. From 
2006 until 2019, President Evo Morales and the Movimiento al socialismo (MAS) led Bolivia to global 
prominence. Experts lauded Morales and the MAS for apparent development successes and democratic 
expansion in a nation long known for its chronic poverty and conflict. Still, by the time of his controversial 
resignation, several socioenvironmental conflicts had diminished his reputation as an ethno-
environmental champion, revealing the tensions inherent in pursuing resource nationalist development in 
an ethnopopulist state. While existing scholarship on the subject views populist and resource nationalist 
strategies and policies separately, their functional convergence in the Isiboro Sécure National Park and 
Indigenous Territory (TIPNIS) conflict demonstrates the necessity of an integrated framework. An 
integrative examination of the TIPNIS conflict reveals that the MAS prioritization of modernist 
development above all else. The Bolivian case provides a unique avenue for insight into progressive 
populism and ethno-environmental governance across Latin American politics, where commitments to 
aggressive visions of developmentalism characterize parties and political actors across the political 
spectrum. 
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This thesis seeks to integrate existing scholarly frameworks of populism, resource nationalism, 
and ethno-environmentalism in order to create a comprehensive understanding of Morales and 
the MAS. From 2006 until 2019, President Evo Morales and the Movimiento al socialismo 
(MAS) led Bolivia to global prominence. Experts lauded Morales and the MAS for apparent 
development successes and democratic expansion in a nation long known for its chronic poverty 
and conflict. Still, by the time of his controversial resignation, several socioenvironmental 
conflicts had diminished his reputation as an ethno-environmental champion, revealing the 
tensions inherent in pursuing resource nationalist development in an ethnopopulist state. While 
existing scholarship on the subject views populist and resource nationalist strategies and policies 
separately, their functional convergence in the Isiboro Sécure National Park and Indigenous 
Territory (TIPNIS) conflict demonstrates the necessity of an integrated framework. An 
integrative examination of the TIPNIS conflict reveals that the MAS prioritization of modernist 
development above all else. The Bolivian case provides a unique avenue for insight into 
progressive populism and ethno-environmental governance across Latin American politics, 
where commitments to aggressive visions of developmentalism characterize parties and political 
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Just five years after performing a sacred Aymara indigenous ritual at Tiwanaku ahead of 
his inauguration, Bolivian president Evo Morales announced plans to build a highway directly 
through a legally protected indigenous territory of great spiritual importance. First designated as 
a natural reserve in 1965, then as an autonomous indigenous territory since 1990, the Isiboro 
Sécure National Park and Indigenous Territory (TIPNIS) in the Amazon Basin of Bolivia 
contains four distinct ecosystems and is home to multiple indigenous communities that Morales’ 
party has increasingly addressed. In 2011, the government, led by Evo Morales, announced plans 
to build the Villa Tunari-San Ignacio de Moxos highway through the TIPNIS, a controversial act 
that angered many grassroots indigenous constituent groups that first brought Morales and his 
party, the Movement Towards Socialism (MAS) to power. The proposed project would extend 
infrastructure to parts of the Amazon that were previously inaccessible to commercial 
development. An ethnic and environmental haven, the TIPNIS has become a site of ongoing 
territorial conflict in Bolivia, highlighting the tensions of progressive politics of inclusion and a 
commitment to rapid development in a country that has long sought to balance modernization 
with traditional indigeneity and environmental respect. Still, Morales’ actions cannot be entirely 
attributed to a case of democratic backsliding. Several fundamental contradictions underlay his 
presidency, yet he retained significant support from indigenous populations and the general 
public throughout his tenure. Morales’ inconsistencies can be best explained by examining the 
interplay between his populism, resource nationalism, and ethno-environmentalism. The 
Bolivian leader tries to make these three elements compatible through different linkages and 
negotiations with civil society and the private sector. However, a range of socioenvironmental 
conflicts mar his presidency and clarifies the incompatibility of this governing proposition. 
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Morales pursues a vision of modernist development, thus relegating all other commitments to 
secondary status.  
The Movement Towards Socialism (MAS) came to power with Evo Morales as president 
in 2006 as part of the Latin American turn to the left following the region’s neoliberal period. A 
progressive regime, the party has redefined relationships and linkages between party, state, and 
social movements. While the general populist expectation is the construction of a unitary, 
exclusive people, the MAS opts for inclusivity to build a broader social base. With Evo Morales 
at the forefront, both the party and president himself have been classified as both an inspiration 
for developing countries worldwide seeking to resist United States hegemony and a socialist 
enemy who seeks to expel all foreign influence. Although traditional socialists focus on domestic 
economic elites, Morales frequently shifts attention to the international arena to foster domestic 
unity. Leftists see him as a progressive victor with the implementation of numerous redistributive 
social programs, while conservatives see him as a radical leftist with an unsustainable economic 
plan. Some see an indigenous hero willing to mobilize a long-marginalized majority population; 
others see a leader with political ambition willing to perform indigenous rituals when convenient 
for his political agenda. The broad spectrum of characterizations indicates scholarly 
disagreement as to the true nature of Evo’s presidency and the MAS’s political strategy. These 
varying portraits all have some basis in reality; his presidency has been full of core 
contradictions. How can one pursue an extractivist model of development while promoting 
indigenous rights? Understanding how these seemingly conflicting elements play out 
functionally is a primary goal of this thesis.  
There is no Evo without populism, without resource nationalism, without his indigeneity. 
To treat any one concept in isolation is to ignore the true complexities of Bolivian politics. I 
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propose an integration of these frameworks to create a comprehensive picture of Morales. 
Despite scholarly assessments, functionally, Morales subverts definition by using a combination 
of populist, environmentalist, and nationalist elements throughout his presidency that has kept 
the party in power for nearly fifteen years. His regime oversaw the amplification of indigenous 
voices, a redistributive welfare program, ensured environmental health for marginalized groups, 
and economic growth, including a sizeable increase in GDP per capita. Despite electoral 
controversies in 2019 leading to the end of Evo’s tenure, these elements sustain the political 
project beyond his individual presidency. By offering a new evaluative framework for 
understanding Evo Morales, I demonstrate how the Bolivian case provides a unique avenue for 
insight into progressive populism and ethno-environmental governance in Latin American 
politics. 
This thesis proceeds with necessary contextualization, first charting the origins of the 
MAS and explaining the Bolivian population’s demographic and geographic dynamics. I also 
explain extractive development, highlighting how National Development Plans have attempted 
to combine ethno-environmentalism and economic growth. Following this introductory section, I 
provide a literature review of relevant scholarship that informs this project. I then introduce the 
three dimensions upon which I evaluate Evo Morales and analyze the ways in which these areas 
merge functionally during the TIPNIS conflict. I provide a thorough account of competing 
interests throughout the conflict and use a conjunctural analysis to highlight specific instances 
when actors’ interests converge and diverge. By examining the MAS's interests and then 
indigenous interests in parallel chronological order, I find a willingness of the party to prioritize 
modernist development over all else. I conclude the thesis by presenting the current state of 
affairs in Bolivia, and aim to demonstrate the broader generalizability of this project.  
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Origins of the MAS 
The Bolivian case requires rich contextualization due to its unique demographic 
composition and the continuing impacts of colonialism. The MAS’s history highlights how 
themes of dispossession have affected the nation for centuries. Evo Morales’ own biography is 
inextricably combined with the party’s rise. Born in 1959, Morales grew up in the Chapare 
region, known best for coca-growing, to a family of Aymara indigenous descent. While 
indigenous peoples have grown coca for thousands of years, the crop became the target of the 
United States Drug Enforcement Agency across Latin America during the 1980s due to its use in 
cocaine production. Law 1008 of 1988 in Bolivia sought to outlaw the crop and impose harsh 
punishments on any illegal cultivation (Anria 2018, 70). Coca farmers in the Chapare, including 
Evo Morales, first organized to resist coca eradication and US imperialism more broadly. The 
MAS grew out of the same organizing bloc in the 1990s, meant to be a political instrument of the 
masses, including indigenous farmers and the working class more broadly. Cocalero, or coca-
growing organizers supported the idea of self-representation and desired political recognition 
(Anria 2018, 72). Still, the MAS was not the first mass-mobilizing party in the nation. In 1952, 
the Nationalist Revolutionary Movement (MNR) came to power, led by middle class reformists 
wanting to break free from oligarchic control and to organize workers and peasants (Crabtree 
2013, 272). As an early predecessor to the resource nationalism of the MAS, the MNR 
nationalized the tin industry, established universal suffrage, and took on a limited land reform. 
Overall, the party provided new channels of representation, yet failed to integrate labor or 
campesinos into politics.  
In the 1990s, the MNR came to power once more, headed by Gonzalo Sánchez de 
Lozada. Lozada undertook a series of reforms meant to encourage the mobilization of Bolivian 
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politics and encourage a celebration of multiculturalism. In line with the rest of Latin America, 
Bolivia embraced neoliberalization and privatization. New, private ownership closed many state-
owned mines. Many unemployed miners migrated to the Chapare region, where they too began 
working as coca farmers and organizing with the cocalero unions. Neoliberal reforms created 
winners and losers, and strong feelings of collective loss. The working class bore the biggest 
impact, and many indigenous groups also lost access and power over newly privatized land. 
However, some previously excluded groups benefited from decentralization reforms which 
allowed them to participate in local elections. The 1994 Law of Popular Participation opened up 
local politics to citizen organizations and added a dimension of territoriality to civil society by 
creating municipalities (Anria 2018, 71). This avenue for increased participation meant rural 
actors, including indigenous peoples, were incorporated into national politics. Within this 
context, Evo Morales and the MAS began politically organizing under various indigenous and 
cocalero coalitions – not yet the movement-based party known today. Rather than organize 
around a broad array of social and economic grievances, the MAS in the 1990s focused 
singularly on local coca growers’ rights.  
Bolivia faced a crisis of representation at the turn of the millennium. Parties who 
specifically promised an end to market-oriented reforms continued neoliberalization policies, 
leading to a mass loss of trust. The MAS took on an opposition stance, growing into a party 
concerned with more than coca growing. In the 2000 “Water War,” Morales took on a role of 
framing the proposed privatization of water collection and delivery in rural and urban areas 
around indigenous issues and sovereignty. (Kohl & Farthing 2012, 229) As a hybrid of 
movement and party networks, the MAS draws its strength from connections to grassroots social 
movements, such as peasant syndicates and indigenous governing coalitions. From its earliest 
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days, the MAS rejected the party label, preferring to call itself an Instrumento Político instead. 
Movement-based parties are loosely organized, decentralized, and grassroots-based. The MAS 
grew from a one-issue party to including a broad discourse with themes of improving everyday 
living standards, anti-imperialism, land reform, nationalism, and reasserting sovereignty over 
natural resources.  
Although originating from rural areas, the MAS needed to build urban alliances to build a 
politically relevant coalition. A key feature of the MAS is its pragmatism and inclusive nature. 
Its rural coalition is rooted in the cocaleros of the Chapare, but also includes three campesino 
groups: The Unique Confederation of Rural Laborers of Bolivia (CSUTCB), the Syndicalist 
Confederation of Intercultural Communities of Bolivia (CSCIB), and the Bartolina Sisa National 
Confederation of Campesino, Indigenous, and Native Women of Bolivia (CNMCIOB-BS). 
While campesino loosely translates to peasant, the identity is primarily that of the rural working 
class. To gain national relevance, the MAS linked with urban-popular organizations, particularly 
in La Paz and El Alto, which together create the largest metropolitan area in Bolivia. This 
linkage marked one of the first examples of a political party’s territorial fluidity. The MAS was 
no longer a strictly rural or indigenous party as its appeals to urban groups based on 
nationalization and redistribution were now substantive and broad.  
The demographic landscape 
Bolivia’s unique characteristics as a landlocked nation with immense natural resource 
wealth and complex demography renders many generalizations made by comparativists 
problematic. Indigeneity impacts Bolivian politics in ways unlike most other countries. With a 
GDP per capita of $3,552.07 in 2019 and a population of just over 10 million, Bolivia is the 
poorest nation in South America, and also one of the smallest (World Bank 2019). Over 60 
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percent of Bolivians have an indigenous background — more than any other Latin American 
state — putting these issues at the center of Bolivian political life (see Figure 1). Moreover, a 
geographic split between highland and lowland areas further fragments the population. 
 
Figure 1. Percent indigenous population of Latin American countries. ECLAC 2012. 
62.2% of Bolivians identify in some way as indigenous, primarily as Aymara and 
Quechua, each with over 1.5 million citizens having declared belonging in the 2012 Census. 
Beyond these majority indigenous nations, electoral laws identify 43 minority nations that exist 
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within Bolivia’s borders, including Afrobolivians and the Chiquitano and Guaraní tribes (see 
Figure 2). Defining indigeneity is difficult worldwide due to historical marginalization of these 
communities. Many people are reluctant to accept external definitions. The UN Permanent 
Forum on Indigenous Issues recommends that self-identification constitute the primary basis of 
identification. Figure 2 demonstrates the importance of self-identification, as in the 2012 Census 
people identified themselves as many different tribes, yet also had options of “originario,” 
“intercultural,” “campesino,” “indígena,” or “indígena u originario no especificado.” 
Furthermore, six tribes labeled as official minority nations or peoples have less than 200 
identifying members, with the Uru-ito tribe having just two respondents claim membership. Even 
as officially recognized groups, many indigenous tribes face rapidly dwindling numbers, 
threatening their very existence. Such a small membership means citizens must boldly assert 




Figure 2. Population of Bolivia declaring membership in one of the Naciones y Pueblos Indígena 
Originario Campesinos (Indigenous Peoples). 2012 Census, INE. 
Closely related to indigenous identity is mestizaje, or interraciality. Many Bolivians opt for this 
label due to historical discrimination against their indigenous identities. In the 1952 Revolution, 
the MNR government pushed assimilation and applied homogeneous labels to all indigenous 
peoples. Still, indigeneity in Bolivia is more than ethnic descent. It is based on language, 
customs, and alternative ontologies. Many Bolivians learn multiple languages in their childhood. 
Non-exclusively, 68.7% of Bolivians learned Spanish as a child, 18% learned Quechua, 11.1% 
learned Aymara, 0.6% learned Guaraní (INE 2012, 31). The state’s official languages include 
Spanish as well as all indigenous languages for the official majority and minority tribes shown in 
Figure 1. Nearly 20% of the population learned Spanish as a second language, indicating 
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indigenous identity may be prioritized over Bolivian/Spanish nationalism at times. Language 
fluidity is a hallmark of Bolivian society, something the MAS eventually capitalizes on.  
 
Figure 3. Physical map of Bolivia.   Figure 4. Indigenous population by municipality.  
There are two relevant geographic dichotomies characterizing the Bolivian population 
that add layers to the existing complexities: the urban/rural and lowland/highland divides. 
Bolivian topography can be split into three discrete regions: the altiplano in the west, shown in 
Figure 3, the llanos and yungas hybrid topography, and the lowlands in the east. The altiplano, a 
high and wide plateau, along with the llanos is home to most of Bolivia’s indigenous population 
and is known as the tierras altas, or highlands (see Figure 4). People of Aymara and Quechua 
descent populate this area primarily. The eastern lowlands consist of parts of Cochabamba and 
the Beni, Pando, and Santa Cruz departments. While most indigenous peoples reside in the 
highlands, Bolivia’s largest city of Santa Cruz, with over a million residents, is situated in the 
lowlands. In 2012, 67.5% of Bolivians were urban residents, and 32.5% lived in rural areas (INE 
2012, 14). These divides are politically relevant: they dictate many of Bolivia’s governing and 
11 
 
organizing coalitions, contributing to the fragmented nature of governance in the country. By 
establishing key ties with constituents across the territorial spectrum, the MAS was able to earn 
broad support outside of their region of origin.  
Extractivist model of development 
 The MAS uses an extractive developmentalist model to spur economic growth and 
finance its redistributive actions. Extractivism, or an economy dependent on the extraction of 
natural resources, has existed for centuries in Bolivia, from the exploitation of silver-rich Potosí 
by the Spaniards in the 1530s through to the present (Klein 2011, 29). Natural resource 
extraction intensified in the 21st century in terms of scale, number of actors, activities, locations, 
and the extent of the ensuing ecological crisis (Svampa 2019a, 2). This new era, known as 
neoextractivism, accompanies a productivist vision of development in Bolivia that privileges 
growth above all. The MAS’s rise to power occurred at the same time as commodity prices 
soared across Latin America and resource nationalism promised to convey returns to the nation. 
When global commodity prices dropped in 2013, neoextraction only intensified further, leading 
to a renewed focus on the export of primary goods, with countries like Bolivia further 
committing to mining their natural wealth. As state spending was tied to extraction, the loss of 
revenue pushed state efforts further. Neoextractivism and low prices introduce a number of 
socioenvironmental struggles not only in Bolivia but across the continent, as large-scale mining 
and monoculture production require large swaths of land and are capital- and technology-
intensive yet generate few jobs. Fourteen mega-dams have been built in the last decade, yet 
extractive industries were not the only sector of the economy where socioenvironmental 
struggles opened up. Land-grabbing has increased to the point that 66 percent of farmland is held 
by one percent of landowners (Svampa 2019b, 9). Extractivist projects tend to occur in rural 
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areas frequently occupied by indigenous and campesino communities, like the TIPNIS, and tend 
to cause severe environmental degradation.  
Once in power, the MAS made major efforts to change state-market relationships and to 
reject the neoliberalization of the prior era. In Bolivia, the MAS adopted a state-led extractive 
development model. By instituting a number of National Development Plans, the party attempted 
to balance concerns over development with concerns for the protection of Bolivia’s natural 
resources. The first Development Plan (PND) in 2006 set out the themes that would continue to 
characterize the MAS for years, namely a transformation of economic ideology away from 
neoliberalism and the incorporation of Vivir Bien, or the idea of ‘living well,’ in a sustainable 
manner that embraces indigenous practices. The plan consists of four national strategies: Bolivia 
Digna, Bolivia Soberana, Bolivia Productiva, and Bolivia Democrática para Vivir Bien. Bolivia 
Digna, or Dignified Bolivia, focuses on the eradication of poverty and inequality. The pillar of 
Soberana (sovereignty) connects development to foreign policy, namely promoting resource 
nationalism and self-determination in the international system. Bolivia Productiva aims to 
diversify the Bolivian economy, through generating a budgetary surplus and boosting incomes. 
Lastly, Bolivia Democrática is concerned with government management and transparency.  
The PND can largely be read as an ideological doctrine rather than a concrete policy 
recommendation. Much of its discourse revolves around a profound rejection of the prior 
neoliberal era, deeming it colonialism. The plan’s introduction describes how inequality and 
social discrimination were exacerbated by reliance on markets rather than the state for allocation 
of resources. Gaps between planned revenue and commodity prices in the neoliberal era were 
solved by NGO and foreign aid. The PND describes these actions as interventions aiming to 
subject Bolivia to foreign interests. It describes neoliberal failures and subsequent “aid” as “a 
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system of ethnic, cultural, and political domination, steeped in racism, and rooted in various 
forms of colonialism” (Ministerio de Planificación de Desarrollo 2006, 12). The PND proposes a 
return to state intervention in order to recover lost sovereignty and to provide redistributive 
welfare to the people. The MAS’s populist constructions of elites frequently reference 
neocolonial experiences, particularly villainizing multinationals. The party blames foreign 
companies for grave economic hardships and embeds this resentment into development plans. 
From environmental health worries over chemical crop eradication to anger at mine 
privatization in the neoliberal era, the MAS has been attentive to the importance of the 
environment in governance. A key part of its progressive discourse has been resource 
nationalism, or the desire to retain sovereignty over the natural resources of a state (Kohl & 
Farthing 2012, 229). It involves the attribution of economic woes to foreign or imperialist 
exploitation. Evo Morales’ rhetoric and the MAS’s development plans center around this 
sentiment. Moreover, they identify connections between indigeneity and development, claiming 
that the only way to truly decolonize is through state-led development (Postero 2017, 17). 
Conflicts over natural resource ownership continue to define Bolivian politics, whether it be the 
ousting of the US Agency for International Development or the nationalization of the 
hydrocarbon industry. However, the TIPNIS conflict presents a case in which the government 
attempts to grab land from the very population resource nationalist ideology prioritizes. Morales 
and the MAS frequently own claims to indigeneity when indigenous populations attempt to 
counter the party’s decision-making.  
Literature Review 
Existing scholarship on Bolivian political dynamics tends to be confined to either a study 
of the state, relegating society to silence, or a study of society, as if there were no state. While 
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the literature spans a number of academic disciplines in the humanities and social sciences, each 
account remains limited to one field. Due to the nature of the Bolivian case and its unique 
demographic and historical structures, I find it necessary to understand subjects like party 
structure together with social and environmental dynamics. Segregation in the literature creates 
generalizations about Morales and the MAS which cannot adequately address decision-making. 
In some dimensions, the MAS has created important ideological discourse, earning its title as a 
model nation for leftism in the region. At other times, research on environmental damage misses 
a discussion of the wider redistributive measures funded by the destruction and the support for 
these policies that exists beyond a modernizing elite or multinational firm. The following texts 
serve to ground this thesis, yet I hope to move beyond narrowed frameworks to show the 
intersectional nature of multiple policy commitments. I assess the literature based on the 
dimensions I set out in the next section: concern with the state, concern with resource 
nationalism, and concern with the environment and indigeneity.  
In The Rise of Ethnic Politics in Latin America, Raúl Madrid (2012) combines 
scholarship on ethnic parties and populist parties, moving away from traditional populist 
definitions offered by Weyland (2001) or de la Torre (2013) who argue a hallmark of populism is 
the homogeneity of ‘the people.’ Instead, he argues that ethnic party inclusivity as opposed to 
exclusivity leads to success in Bolivia, and Latin America as a whole. Through individual-level 
survey data and statistical analysis, he proves that the MAS’s electoral success was due to a 
strategy that would speak to all facets of the population, regardless of geographical location or 
ethnic group. According to his findings, the MAS creates homogeneity in rhetoric. Madrid’s 
research successfully expands the definition of populism, something I find essential for the 
Bolivian case. At the same time, his treatment of indigeneity in electoral appeal lacks depth. He 
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does not provide examples of Evo Morales connecting with indigenous culture in terms of 
garments and language, both things that allow populist figures to reach their base. Moreover, 
Madrid does not elaborate on any policy commitments promised or provided to indigenous 
peoples. The book thoroughly explains the MAS’s connections to indigenous political 
organizations, but leaves out an account for how it reached people on an individual level.  
Crabtree (2013) asks to what extent Morales and the MAS can be usefully described as 
populist in his chapter of Latin American Populism in the Twenty-First Century. To answer this 
question, he uses a historical-comparative method, comparing the MAS to the previous 
revolutionary government of 1952 (the MNR) as well as the neoliberal period post-1985. By 
looking at the populist features of those time periods in comparison to that of the MAS, Crabtree 
shows how the MAS does utilize traditionally populist elements. He claims effective 
characterization depends on one's theoretical definition, particularly if they subscribe to a 
Laclauian view of populism. According to Laclau, populism is a way of articulating politics that 
emerges when the existing political system cannot meet a specific set of social demands, such as 
incorporation of the working classes. He argues that the key consequence of the MAS’s reign is 
not necessarily its populism, but the way it redefined relationships and linkages between party, 
state, and social movements. I reject his claim that populism is constrained by social movements, 
a view that likely stems from an exclusive definition of populism in which the constructed 
people must have a unitary background and vantage point. Moreover, Crabtree devotes time to 
consider whether Morales should be seen as simply part of a communitarian tradition rather than 
as a subversive force in politics. Overall, he demonstrates how Morales and the MAS 
transformed the political makeup of Bolivia in ways that cannot be understated.  
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 Anria (2018) explains exactly why social movements are so vital to populist success in 
Bolivia in his book When Movements Become Parties. Achieving and maintaining grassroots 
participation after assuming power has been elusive for political parties in Latin America, but the 
MAS has generally succeeded. He finds that movement-based parties have key attributes such as 
a grassroots social base and internally democratic structure that allow them to defy traditional 
oligarchization in governance. Interestingly, parties with high degrees of internal 
democratization often then pursue redistributive policies. While this text provides a key 
understanding of the MAS’s rise to power and the dynamics underlying its original victory, it 
fails to include how indigenous groups specifically are included or not in the internal workings 
of the MAS as time progresses.  
 Rather than discuss the workings of the state, some scholars focus on the contradictions 
that exist within the party’s resource nationalist framework. Resource nationalism is a policy and 
discourse formed around grievance politics, something closely related to ethnopopulism, yet 
rarely is a direct connection made between the two concepts. Kohl and Farthing (2012) highlight 
the realities of extractive-dependent economies, arguing that resource nationalism within such a 
development model not only limits government policy options but continues to fuel social 
protest. Structures created by extractive economics constrain decision-makers, that is, extractive 
economics generate environmental destruction and subsequent protests, yet also fund crucial 
social welfare programs. They contemplate the importance of the “stolen coastline” to Bolivia, 
an outcome of the War of the Pacific in the 19th century and how that loss has spurred a sense of 
collective injury which in turn contributes to building resource nationalist frames. Closely 
related, yet not mentioned by the authors is the connection between collective injury or loss and 
populist appeals. Following their logic, using grievance politics opens up criticisms of 
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extractivism as a whole. Laing (2020) also finds that resource nationalism supersedes indigenous 
ontologies, despite the fact that the MAS’s electoral appeal was due to the ability to connect this 
type of nationalism to indigenous self-determination. Through an ethnographic account of the 
TIPNIS conflict, she found that indigenous protestors altered their demands as the state took on a 
more restrictive stance. She unpacks the contradictions that exist between the MAS’s intent to 
give recognition to indigenous groups through the creation of a plurinational state and their 
neoextractivist model of development. Her article provides relevant analysis of state-indigenous 
conflict, yet again misses a prime opportunity to criticize or acknowledge the role of populism.  
 Understanding resource nationalism in a different way, in Governing Extractive 
Industries, Bebbington et. al. (2018) use a political settlement lens to demonstrate the ways in 
which natural resources have been used as a stake in coalition building and political negotiations. 
A political settlement is a balance of power in governance among differing social groups. 
Political settlements change when national or subnational actors materialize to challenge the 
status quo. Indigenous movements would constitute such actors, and the ways in which natural 
resource industries are governed is a function of the political settlement. This lens of analysis 
prioritizes power dynamics rather than institutions, making it a compelling model for 
understanding Bolivia, where institutions have been volatile in the past decades. Still, the authors 
contend that since 2006 there has been a stable political settlement. With widespread 
socioenvironmental conflict and coalitions crumbling, let alone a major election controversy in 
2019, the MAS’s reign particularly since Morales’ third term beginning in 2012 can hardly be 
classified as ‘stable.’ Resource nationalist narratives often lack the connection between 
development and indigeneity that even the government makes. 
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 Writing primarily on environmental politics, Argentinian sociologist Maristella Svampa 
argues that the consolidation of progressive political hegemony in Latin America is intimately 
linked to the commodity boom and neoextractivism. Neoextractivism creates a number of 
socioenvironmental struggles. Using qualitative evidence from across the region, Svampa (2019) 
shows how the Morales government has used political manipulation to argue against indigenous 
and environmental opposition to infrastructure projects like the Villa Tunari - San Ignacio de 
Moxos Highway. Her concept of the “ecoterritorial turn,” or the convergence of indigenous and 
environmental discourse during the 2000s and construction of collective action frames provides 
key theoretical basis to this thesis. The ecoterritorial turn is significantly connected to ideas of 
integrative environmental justice. While her research is primarily theoretical, it leaves out a 
discussion of the necessity of redistribution in Bolivia and an analysis of its benefits. She 
assumes the private sector is incompatible with true economic growth, despite the contributions 
of redistribution and small farming and business activities to the alleviation of poverty in the 
country. Such a strictly Marxist perspective limits the applicability of her argument. Although 
the harms of extractivism with extensive focus on mega infrastructure projects are clear, Svampa 
only loosely connects this to other policy and reasoning.  
In her book The Indigenous State, Nancy Postero (2017) provides a more integrative 
framework for evaluating Evo Morales. She emphasizes the importance of his decolonizing 
attitude and the revision of laws and the constitution to have an environmental tilt. Her argument 
is one of the most balanced, asserting that Morales has been able to partially fulfill promises yet 
his extractive model permanently limits growth. There is a continued reliance on market 
capitalism which means many of the neoliberal relationships he sought to dismantle have not 
changed in practice. Still, she finds that his discourse of “economic liberation” is not merely a 
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farce and is indeed supported by an emerging indigenous middle class. Her argument reveals 
disagreement in the literature as few are willing to admit such populist discourse has no real 
economic policy implications nor consequences beyond rhetoric. 
Adding a strictly indigenous perspective to the field, Bolivian sociologist and feminist 
theorist Silvia Rivera Cusicanqui (2012) criticizes common narratives of decolonization and 
brings an anarcho-indigenous lens to understanding not only Bolivian but Latin American 
politics as a whole. In her 2004 essay Reclaiming the Nation, she traces the convergence of 
different indigenous and social actors throughout the 20th and 21st centuries, identifying pivotal 
moments in political history such as the Katarista-Indianista reemergence in the 1970s which led 
to the founding of a national indigenous organization and several indigenous political parties, 
and the cocalero movement beginning in the 1980s. She correctly predicted multiple crises of the 
state, not just that of neoliberalism, and argued that the United States’ neocolonialism would 
bring a more forceful indigenous insurgency. Her 2012 article, Ch'ixinakax utxiwa: A Reflection 
on the Practices and Discourses of Decolonization, written around the time of the TIPNIS, 
argues that the MAS continues to view the indigenous population as a traditional minority rather 
than as a contemporary body with modern interests and needs. Similarly, Bolivian intellectual 
and former Presidential Representative to the Constituent Assembly Oscar Vega Camacho 
(2019) takes on a highly critical attitude towards Morales evolving from his original position as a 
member of the MAS, arguing that the party has become completely oligarchic rather than 
decolonized. Still, Morales frequently references the decolonization of the state. With their more 
limited scope, these scholars represent only the indigenous perspective in the overarching 
narrative, and do not represent the campesino or urban working populations. 
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A considerable section of the literature criticizes the MAS for its actions within the 
TIPNIS conflict. Fabricant and Postero (2015) use ethnographic research on the MAS, lowland 
indigenous peoples, and national indigenous unions to argue that one cannot understand TIPNIS 
without understanding lowland extractive industries and agricultural production. They emphasize 
a link to the legacy of colonization, finding that racialized patterns of oppression and exploitation 
have characterized the lowlands since Spanish rule. Interestingly, the MAS claims their actions 
in the TIPNIS protect lowland indigenous peoples and call upon the same environmental 
legislation being used to oppose the project. Key Bolivian legislation includes conservationist 
protections for the environment in the same documents that promote development. Certain 
indigenous actors emphasize the protections afforded by law, while the MAS stresses the 
freedoms laid out for development. The ethnography provides a detailed description of all actors’ 
reasoning in conflict and the ways traditional adversaries like indigenous groups and elites can 
unite over a common interest, such as retaining an area of great ethnic and environmental 
importance. While it supplies key evidence, Fabricant and Postero argue the MAS ignores 
essential factors like the impacts of racism and colonialism. That begs the question: does 
ethnopopulism account for such factors? Do such populist tactics merely exist alongside 
structural issues like racism, or are they actively shaped by them?  
 While many efforts have been put forth to study the themes of this thesis, few, if any, 
have synthesized the themes of populism, resource nationalism, and ethno-environmentalism in 
such a way that does not make assumptions about the nature of the MAS. Existing arguments 
range from highly critical to congratulatory, with most authors ultimately placing the MAS 
somewhere in the center of the political spectrum. They fail to articulate how populist governing 
tactics impact ethno-environment mobilization, and frequently refuse to acknowledge the 
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importance of redistribution. Those who examine populism and state governance in Latin 
America frequently ignore the actual harms of the current development model. Clearly, a more 
holistic framework is needed.  
Methods 
The primary goal of this thesis is to create an integrated framework for understanding 
Evo Morales and MAS. I find that massive social movements trying to enter politics all have 
populist tendencies, such as nationalist rhetoric, anti-establishment messaging, and redistributive 
platforms. The MAS is no exception. Once in power, do these parties’ populist tendencies 
expand or harm environmentalism, and thus indigeneity? How can ethnopopulism exist within an 
extractive model of development? Does indigeneity exist only symbolically in governance for 
the MAS? These core questions obviously require contextualization in both Bolivian politics and 
culture as well as in Latin American populism. While the literature has extensively criticized 
extractivism, studies of Bolivian populism fail to account for resource nationalism as populist 
discourse. Review of the evidence indicates a reactionary cycle of sorts existing between 
indigenous desires and demands and the goals and directions of the MAS. While the extractivist 
model has been the hegemonic discourse of the 21st century, the existence of strong 
environmentalist legal frameworks in Bolivia still indicates a willingness to value nature. I 
connect the themes of this research, namely populism, natural resource governance, indigenous 
politics, and development in order to create a new framework for understanding the MAS. Such 
research will provide a model that can be used comparatively.  
To effectively study the issues at hand, I compare interests during a time where these 
issues play out simultaneously in order to examine their convergences and divergences. There 
are demonstrated correlations between specific actions and the expansion or harm of ethno-
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environmentalism. The TIPNIS conflict serves as a well-known, multilayered conflict in recent 
Bolivian history that demonstrates the breakdown of many populist alliances for the MAS and 
the potential destruction of a major protected Indigenous area of the Bolivian Amazon 
ecosystem. While the central conflict revolves around the year 2011 when Evo Morales approved 
the initial BNDES loan, the events that conspired cannot be siloed to just that year. The conflict 
offers a case where indigenous demands are on equal footing and in opposition to those of the 
government and requires contextualization that will provide a holistic understanding of the logics 
involved. Existing scholarship has primarily examined the TIPNIS only as a point of critique for 
the MAS, rather than as a series of events that created new relationships and linkages for all 
facets of society and government.  
I first follow the state as a principal actor in conflict, charting its interests and actions. 
While examining the data, I define events specifically in a legal sense, charting laws and state 
plans, as well as government actions. This includes but is not limited to: legislation on economic 
use of protected areas, extractive decrees, and economic strategy as it relates to areas in the 
TIPNIS like Beni and Cochabamba. Legal frameworks focusing on ethno-environmentalism 
such as the Earth Bills granting rights to nature and the 2009 Constitution centered around 
plurinationalism and indigenous rights provide key evidence as well. They reveal official policy 
pertaining to indigeneity and give an important point of comparison: how does the State act in 
principle? Since a core part of this thesis is also studying the particular qualities of populist 
movements as defined above, I include the official rhetoric via speeches by Evo Morales and key 
administrators of the MAS, primarily Vice President Alvaro García Linera, and examine whether 
rhetorical strategies changed as a result of the conflict in the TIPNIS. I seek to understand 
whether any alteration was temporary or continued after the conflict denouement. This analysis 
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includes contextualizing events from the previous neoliberal administrations, such as the 
Cochabamba Water War protests and response in 2000, but primarily revolves around 2006-2014 
in order to focus on the TIPNIS.  
A second section charts indigenous interests, again revolving around the 2011 conflict 
but encompassing key points of context. All events for this analysis again relate to the 
environment and indigenous groups themselves. This includes key instances of collective action, 
such as marches and demonstrations, as well as rhetoric of primary leaders, and voting patterns 
of major grassroots alliances. While I trace the evolution of the Unity Pact over the course of 
Evo Morales’ tenure, I focus on the groups concerned with the TIPNIS. The groups in question 
consist of the National Council of Ayllus and Markas of Qullasuyu (CONAMAQ), a highland 
indigenous coalition, the lowland Confederation of Indigenous Peoples of Bolivia (CIDOB), and 
the Indigenous Council of the South, an organization of those living within the southern part of 
the TIPNIS. Indigenous communities of the TIPNIS, namely the Yucaré, Trinitario-Mojeño, and 
Chimane people, all have their own output and sentiments, but I focus on indigenous 
organizations’ official statements. I also include any instances where indigenous ontologies of 
Buen Vivir are recognized or emphasized with official statements and documents. 
This comparative analysis is derived from the theory of Marshall Sahlins to specifically 
analyze the ‘structure of the conjuncture’ of overlapping events. As a political anthropologist, 
Sahlins’ work studies the causation of cultural change and developed his theory in order to 
merge both deterministic and structural accounts. In his 1985 work Islands of History, he found 
that humans have agency in enacting cultural change, as do underlying forces, or structures, 
which may be demographic, geographic, or political. Conjunctural analysis acknowledges both 
underlying structures that shape events as well as individual agency in decision-making. A 
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conjuncture is the convergence of all underlying forces in which each contributes to the event 
itself yet also contributes to the defining of other forces. Applied to my project, each point of 
overlap between interest groups has its own structure to be unpacked. At each conjunction, I 
examine power dynamics, resource ownership, demands, and responses of the various actors 
involved.  
Evaluative Dimensions  
Throughout his tenure, Evo Morales used distinct elements of populism, resource 
nationalism, and ethno-environmentalism to create and retain a powerful electoral base and 
achieve governing imperatives. The following section seeks to demonstrate how these aspects 
are not interchangeable, but concurrent and deeply help commitments which must be understood 
within a specific Latin American economic context. While each individual element provides a 
useful way to understand the Andean leader, the three strategies must be considered in 
conjunction to gain a holistic grasp on the Bolivian case. Populism and resource nationalism are 
inextricably connected due to their emotional appeals and ability to create a unifying narrative of 
sovereignty and respect. As Morales’ rule continued, ethno-environmentalism is discarded and 
subsumed by resource nationalism. Still, the themes of indigenous environmental discourse 
ground Morales’ original campaign and early years in office. This section provides an in-depth 
explanation of each strategy.  
Populism 
 Populism is a historically salient aspect of Latin American politics. As a political 
strategy, style, and at times an ideology, defining populism has been a contentious debate around 
the world for decades. Focusing on Latin America, populist movements have manifested 
throughout the region since the 1940s. Morales’ classification as a populist has great importance 
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given his rise to power on a platform upheld by deep engagement from grassroots and civil 
society actors. Since 2005, the MAS has dominated Bolivian electoral politics, collecting over 
50% of votes in three consecutive presidential elections (see Figure 5). After controversy in 2019 
sent electoral results into question, the party earned 55.1% of votes even without a Morales 
candidacy. Before 2002, indigenous parties similar to the MAS were unable to reach political 
relevance, faring poorly in elections (Madrid 2012, 2). What set the MAS apart was its populist 
tendencies: antagonism towards elites, ethnic and emotional appeals, redistributive economics, 
and personalistic leadership. Radical populism was an essential part of the MAS’s initial victory 
and ascent to power. Most importantly, populism explains Morales’ willingness to make 
contradictory decisions while governing. Although an integral part of his leadership, the 
populism that brought the MAS to power became used for repression of indigenous populations 
during later conflict. 
 
Figure 5. Percent of vote totals for the MAS in presidential elections 
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Scholars have categorized Latin American populism into three distinct stages: classical, 
neoliberal, and radical. The first wave of classical populism throughout the 1940s can be 
characterized by its redistribution and incorporation of previously disenfranchised groups, 
primarily the working classes (de la Torre 2017, 196). State-led development via import 
substitution industrialization captured the economies of many nations. When ISI policies failed 
to catalyze true economic growth, many countries faced a period of stagnation. Following the 
disappointments of ISI, the neoliberal populist wave took hold in the 1980s and 1990s, 
concerned with reversing the economic stagnation of the prior decades. Populism frequently 
emerges after crises of representation or of state legitimacy (Weyland 2001). Another crisis 
occurred across Latin America when neoliberal policy prescriptions failed to promote true 
economic growth (de la Torre 2017, 200). In the context of the region’s turn to the left, leaders 
like Evo Morales, Hugo Chávez of Venezuela, and Rafael Correa of Ecuador are labeled the 
“radical populists” of the 21st century (200). Radical populism uses constituent power as a 
revolutionary force, leading to a refounding of the state, as seen in Bolivia’s 2009 Constitution. 
As a whole, populism is the emergence of mass politics challenging an elite power. The populist 
constituency divides politics into two antagonistic and irreconcilable camps (de la Torre 2017, 
195). In a Manichean duality, the populist camp (“the people”) are an inherently righteous group 
challenging evil, frequently manifested as oligarchic rule or foreign elites. Each manifestation 
then has its own particular qualities. 
Evo Morales meets the traditional criteria for populism, placing him into a particular 
leadership category with infamous colleagues like Chávez and Perón. As a so-called radical 
populist, he used personal charisma to create majoritarian mobilization out of a diverse 
population. Populist electoral strategies frequently use one prominent personality both in ruling 
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and campaigning. That leader must be imagined as one of the masses, able to connect with the 
populace in a non-hierarchical manner. The MAS used populist electoral strategies, with Morales 
as the central strongman backed by a massive social base. Morales frequently emphasized his 
coca grower roots and experience in union organizing. Although the MAS began with bottom-up 
mobilization (in contrast to the expected top-down populist consolidation), the party eventually 
evolved into a top-down entity as the TIPNIS conflict developed. Another key populist quality 
exhibited by Morales and the MAS is their incorporation of lower classes and poorer areas. 
Using discourse about redistribution, Morales reincorporated the constituents first brought into 
politics by the MNR. As all populist leaders do, Morales used anti-establishment rhetoric and 
emphasized the party’s social movement roots in campaigns. He called on his unionist past to 
demonstrate his willingness to protest the ruling parties. Morales fixates not only on domestic 
political elites, but on who he deems to be imperialists in the country. He constructs the 
dangerous other as United States imperialism and foreign intervention more broadly. By 
construing an outside force as the other, Morales further expands his inclusivity to constitute the 
nation as all those within Bolivia’s border. In his first presidential election, Morales stated that 
“we will defend the national territory against all forms of North American penetration” (Madrid 
2012, 67). His statist agenda appealed to people across the political spectrum, and his resource 
nationalist rhetoric garnered support from Bolivians on the right (Madrid 2012, 68). The final 
traditionally populist quality to note is Morales’ down-to-earth style. Populist candidates 
frequently rely on their humble origin stories to connect with the people. In this way, Morales is 
truly of the people. The president never attended college, nor did he finish high school. His 
genuine indigenous origins and work with the population allowed him to easily build trust in a 
nation where political distrust was high.  
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Morales’ populism also contains a multitude of unique attributes. In the pursuit of clarity, 
many scholars opt to create restrictive definitions for populism, frequently centering around the 
exclusivity of “the people.” Some experts believe populists must construct a unified, 
homogeneous people out of the citizenry, which is not the case for Bolivia. Morales emphasizes 
inclusivity in his campaigns, never speaking to just one demographic or geographic area. 
Although he is of Aymara indigenous descent, the indigeneity exhibited in his discourse 
exemplifies a broader understanding of tradition, rather than appealing to strictly Aymara people. 
John Crabtree (2013) also emphasizes Morales’ use of indigeneity and participatory principles. 
He describes communitarian traditions and a spirit of active participation adopted by the MAS. 
Although its accountability to its social base has diminished over time, Morales and the party 
have been surprisingly responsive to grassroots constituents (Crabtree 2013, 284). Instead of 
choosing technocrats for his cabinet, Morales chose leaders from his social base. Even when 
social groups were in opposition to each other, Morales constantly reaffirmed linkages to avoid 
widespread opposition (286). 
While Morales and the MAS clearly demonstrate standard populist qualities, certain 
attributes like ethnicity play a larger role than some scholars contend. I adopt the term 
“ethnopopulism” from Raúl Madrid’s larger work The Rise of Ethnic Politics in Latin America, 
as the Bolivian case truly emphasizes traditional populism combined with ethnic appeals. An 
ethnopopulist party combines particular qualities of both instruments. According to Madrid, 
ethnic parties prioritize the interests of a specific ethnic group (6). Although they use similar 
tactics, populists can appeal to a group on a number of bases besides ethnicity. At the same time, 
ethnicity is a powerful identifier that when used in an inclusive manner can create a broad 
coalition for a given leader or candidate. The key to ethnopopulism is this appeal that articulates 
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inclusiveness. The MAS incorporated both indigenous and non-indigenous organizations into its 
alliance, centering its platform around general leftist ideas like state intervention and social 
welfare. Inclusivity succeeds more often than ethnic polarization campaigns, as social and ethnic 
identities can be constructed and deconstructed rather than rely on an inherent quality. In a 
society like Bolivia with fluid ethnicity, the MAS balances historical cleavages. Widespread 
mestizaje in the country helps soften identity boundaries and contributes to the party’s ability to 
unify a diverse public. Madrid argued that ethnopopulism succeeds when there are low levels of 
ethnic polarization, as exhibited in Bolivia (36).  
The MAS uses a number of specifically ethnic appeals which are effective in Bolivia due 
to the country’s unique demographic makeup. Broad appeals come with a certain level of 
ambiguity that allows Morales to speak to all people and yet no specific group all at once. When 
convenient, the state may direct rhetoric to an undifferentiated people with the guarantee that it 
will resonate with at least one faction, whether or not it angers the rest. Different groups may 
interpret ethnic appeals differently. The MAS’s appeals to ethnicity range from emotional 
rhetoric to physical ceremony to tangible linkages between state and indigenous governments. 
As a movement-based party, the MAS has close ties with indigenous organizations, particularly 
with Aymara coca grower unions in Cochabamba. After connecting the organization with his 
own indigenous roots, Morales reached out to the Quechua-speaking population as the second-
largest ethnic majority in the nation (Madrid 2012, 53). Endorsement from large organizations 
like the Unified Syndical Confederation of Rural Workers of Bolivia (CSUTCB) and 
coordination among lowland organizing groups gave the MAS further legitimacy as it built 
popularity. The MAS also ran numerous indigenous candidates under its party umbrella for high-
profile positions. With Evo Morales promoting his Aymara heritage, the MAS made sure to 
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include indigenous leaders in its political ranks. Beyond the lower local levels, the MAS 
frequently recruited candidates from the indigenous constituent communities and allowed local 
organizations to nominate the candidates on occasion (55).  
Beyond political structure, ethnopopulism in Bolivia comes in the form of rhetoric and 
demands. Morales regularly uses symbolic appeals of indigeneity to signal his alliance with the 
people. In his speeches, he describes an ongoing struggle against colonialism and the defense of 
sovereignty and culture. Anti-colonial invocations hold particular weight for many indigenous-
identifying people who have faced persecution, assimilation campaigns, and threats to existence 
by outside entities for hundreds of years. Moreover, rhetoric criticizing colonialism and 
imperialism directly implicates local elites, many of whom instituted foreign contracts or have a 
strictly Spanish heritage as opposed to mestizo or indigenous origins. Morales also articulates 
traditional indigenous demands, like defense of coca growing in the face of US eradication 
programs and includes broader social issues like education and security.  
While the MAS carefully built a broad, indigenous-led coalition, signs existed from the 
start that it was more superficial than a genuine transformation. On the one hand, indigenous 
leaders are included as elected representatives within the party. On the other hand, Morales picks 
more candidates himself than those invited into the party. As shown in later sections, he 
performs sacred indigenous rituals while his development strategies desecrate protected 
indigenous territories. He encourages an active celebration of indigeneity, but when that identity 
is exercised in conflict against the state it is considered treasonous. Ethnopopulism masks core 




Resource Nationalism  
 While ethnopopulism adequately explains rhetorical actions and voter mobilization, the 
actual policy commitments of the MAS must be considered. On May 1, 2006, also known as 
Workers’ Day, Evo Morales nationalized the hydrocarbons industry. Four years later to the day, 
the former president nationalized electricity firms in 2010. In his first inaugural address, Morales 
stated that “the new economic regime of Bolivia must be fundamentally based on natural 
resources” (Thomson et al. 2018, 63). These actions and attitudes indicate a larger discourse that 
permeates the Morales presidency and the MAS. Morales uses resource nationalist rhetoric and 
policy to capture popular sentiment and push forward an economic agenda based on state 
ownership and extraction of natural resources. While the state oil and gas company, Yacimientos 
Petrolíferos Fiscales Bolivianos (YPFB) has existed since 1937 with the expropriation of the 
United States Standard Oil Company, the period of MNR rule transformed Bolivia into a net-
exporter (“Historia de YPFB”). Still, different regimes encouraged foreign investment in the 
hydrocarbons industry, and by 1996 President Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada broke YPFB into 
private firms run by foreign states. The firms only paid 18% royalties to the state. Morales 
revived the national hydrocarbons company and negotiated new contracts with international 
firms that gave the country more than 50% hydrocarbon royalties. As the assertion of state 
sovereignty over the natural resource wealth within a country’s borders, resource nationalism has 
many facets and realizations in Bolivia.  
 Resource nationalism emerges out of practice. It is part of a broader anti-colonial 
nationalism in many resource-rich states where control of resources by outside actors, usually 
parastatal themselves to the colonial power, create great mistrust over contracts. Bolivians have 
mobilized around this issue since the 1930s, but the grievances have existed since the Spanish 
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colonial rule that lasted from the 1530s until 1825 (Klein 2011, 98). The Spanish first organized 
and coerced Bolivian laborers into mining Potosí, a site of great mythological and spiritual 
importance. After the end of the official colonial era, resource ownership continued to be 
controlled by both white Spaniards living in the country, and outside entities principally 
originating in Spain. These companies targeted silver from the mining centers of Potosí and 
Oruro, and when silver dropped in value moved their sights to tin. Bolivians constituted the main 
labor source for these companies, yet did not retain the profits. They were subject to harsh 
conditions and received few concessions from the state. The War of the Chaco in the 1930s in 
which Bolivia made massive territorial concessions to Paraguay mobilized indigenous 
populations to counter the ruling classes. The spread of distrust towards the established political 
class eventually became the 1952 Revolution in which the MNR gained power and incorporated 
the middle classes with a platform based entirely on nationalism.  
 Definitionally, resource nationalism can be broken down into several different 
components, both political and economic. At its essence, resource nationalism implies both a 
resource aspect and nationalist/identity aspect. Natural resources are raw materials occurring in 
nature. They can be used for economic gain or consumption. Some scholars understand resources 
with a dialectical perspective, with resources only holding meaning in relation to their mode of 
production (Koch and Perreault 2019, 615). Although in this sense natural resources may be a 
constructed idea, I treat them as naturally occurring materials of immense value to the state. 
While control of natural resources is often a point of contention between states worldwide, 
resource nationalism distinctly connects resource governance to a social identity and assertion of 
a specific nation or nation-state (612). As nationalism emerges under specific social and 
economic conditions, resource nationalism commonly arises in commodity-exporting countries 
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where market volatility makes it vital for a nation to assert ownership over natural resources and 
ensure that citizens can survive economic recession. Resource nationalism becomes salient in 
such states because hydrocarbons, minerals, and other resources are of strategic importance 
(612). At the same time, leaders must find ways to create support for development strategies 
based on natural resources, as extraction is a historically fraught subject with enduring 
resentment and trauma from mistreatment of workers in the mining industry. To do so, leaders 
link resource extraction to identity politics.  
 Historian Benedict Anderson in his famed work discussed the construction of “imagined 
communities” as a basis for understanding nationalism. Nations are not defined by territory or 
political borders, rather they are imagined surrounding a given characteristic or characteristics 
(Anderson 2006). Following Anderson’s theory, nations may be based on geography, language, 
ethnicity, and more. They can be attached to a state, but frequently operate as subunits to the 
larger political body. The state may assume nationhood based on a community it constructs, but 
different groups and nations within a state can assert resource nationalism (Koch and Perrault 
2018, 612). Manifestations of resource nationalism can come in the form of state-led activity like 
industry nationalizations, or through murals in cities expressing the desire for sovereignty (Kohl 
and Farthing 2012, 227). In Bolivia, the 2009 Constitution declared the country to be a 
“plurinational state,” acknowledging the existence of many indigenous nations existing within its 
boundaries. Furthermore, the Bolivian government creates other communities while attempting 
to assert “the people.” If we understand the nation as an imagined community, resource 
nationalists construct community based on natural resources. They believe that the people of the 
nation should benefit from the natural resources below and around them, not foreign enterprises. 
Koch and Perrault (2018) interestingly unpack the etymology of resource nationalism, revealing 
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that the two distinct terms are linguistically and conceptually related. In Bolivia, natural 
resources are frequently called “patrimonio nacional” or national patrimony (621). Patrimonio 
has origins in the word patria, meaning fatherland, and patriótica, or patriotic. In the Andean 
region, patria is more frequently used than nación to refer to the nation. So, patrimonio nacional 
distinctly connects natural resources to nationalism (622). The MAS uses resource nationalist 
frames and actions to fill a historic longing and further their development agenda.  
 In Bolivia, anti-imperialism is closely linked to nationalism. With continued grievances 
and feelings of collective loss from colonialism and privatizations, anti-imperial sentiment is 
salient among Bolivians who feel their territory has been unfairly seized or exploited by 
outsiders. Nationalism and anti-imperialism mobilize the Bolivian population. When these items 
are connected to natural resource governance, citizens view resources as a way to solve the 
country’s economic problems. That connection creates unrealistic expectations or imaginaries 
(Kohl and Farthing 2012, 226). Extractivism, the process of natural resource exploitation which 
can be lucrative for a resource-rich country, only furthers these imaginaries. Extractive industries 
are capital- and technology-intensive, yet do not generate employment opportunities or stimulate 
local economies (226). Bolivia’s economy depends on resource rents from natural gas, and the 
MAS uses those rents to fund social welfare programs. Extractivism for social purposes exists as 
the actualization of resource nationalist frames. Resource rents fund cash transfer programs like 
Renta Dignidad for the elderly, Juana Azurduy for pregnant mothers, or Juancito Pinto for 
school-age children (Bebbington 2018). Control of natural resources benefits those of the 
resource-nationalist nation.  
 Resource nationalism keeps emotional subjects like dispossession or underdevelopment 
salient in the population. Likewise, constant reinforcement of grievances through national 
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holidays, speeches, and laws serve as an ongoing reminder of the collective nation. The 1879–
1883 War of the Pacific against Chile continues to be a prominent example used in resource 
nationalist discourse. In the War, Bolivia lost its coastline, and thus major access to natural 
resources and exporting routes. The annual Day of the Sea holiday commemorates this loss and 
reminds the nation of grief and resentment. Constant reminders of loss make it more likely that 
policy actions to reverse trends of dispossession will be popular among the public.  
 Evo Morales came to power as a result of the ousting of President Gonzalo Sánchez de 
Lozada over his plans to export natural gas to Chile. A grassroots assertion of resource 
nationalism, Morales’ claiming that “the gas is ours” during the 2003–2005 Gas War protests 
signaled the Bolivian repossession over natural resources. Similarly, Supreme Decree 2870, the 
hydrocarbon nationalization executive order, is aptly titled “Heroes of the Chaco.” The title 
references the War of the Chaco with Paraguay from 1932–35, a war in which Bolivia lost 
numerous soldiers and territory (Kohl and Farthing 2012, 229). Such a title binds natural 
resources to a national imaginary about defense of territory and the reassertion of sovereignty.  
 While resource nationalism exists a powerful grievance, the associated tangible 
nationalization policies allow the government to profit from a lucrative industry. Refounding the 
YPFB meant the state once again benefited from the minerals below the surface and increased its 
national revenue by 578% (Arauz et al. 2019, 8). More importantly, resource nationalist policies 
gave the state the ability to take back power and renegotiate contracts with foreign enterprises. 
Such a demonstration of sovereignty solidified the nation as a true business partner and not 
merely a subordinate.  
With its appeals to collective anger and loss, resource nationalism shares many attributes 
with the populism expressed by Evo Morales and the MAS. While the ideology exists as a 
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distinct political and economic concept, it is exercised in tandem with populism in Bolivia. The 
simplest way to assume the will of the populist people is to make a nation salient. In the case of 
Bolivia, the enduring effects of colonization and an abundance of natural resource wealth create 
a situation in which the government easily unifies the population behind the cause. Moreover, 
resource nationalism exists as an actual policy commitment used by the MAS to re-engage in the 
realm of international commerce and indicate state power after decades of submission to foreign 
actors.  
Ethno-environmentalism 
Ethno-environmentalism permeates many aspects of both MAS governance and Bolivian 
society and complicates the government’s strategy and policy options. The term ethno-
environmentalism describes the inextricable connections understood by Latin American 
indigenous groups between indigeneity and respect for the natural environment. Although 
articulated differently at different times by state and indigenous actors, ethno-environmentalism 
highlights the centrality of both ethnicity and natural resources in politics. As the third evaluative 
dimension for understanding Evo Morales, it is important to acknowledge how he and the MAS 
alter the indigenous worldview of Vivir Bien to fit their own strategic political goals. Non-state 
actors promote ethno-environmental ideas to showcase the contradictions embedded in state 
policy and counter the MAS development agenda. There is no indigeneity in Bolivia without 
careful consideration of its relationship to the natural world.  
 Espoused in both rhetoric and law, both the indigenous state headed by Morales and 
indigenous coalitions assert the notion of Vivir Bien, or Living Well. Indigenous ontologies 
extend throughout Bolivian culture, consisting of alternate forms of knowledge and ways of 
knowing the world. Vivir Bien has gained influence throughout Latin America and is at the core 
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of critical Bolivian legislation, including the 2009 Constitution. Vivir Bien merges 
environmental and indigenous discourse, embracing legal pluralism and brings territoriality into 
question (Lalander and Lembke 2018, 637). While the concept builds upon highly regarded 
international legislation, it cannot be attributed to a single tribe or group. The indigenous social 
philosophy presents nature at the center of human life, instead of economic gains (Svampa 2019, 
43). Vivir Bien defines the relationship between indigeneity and nature, and redefines the 
relationship between human beings and other living things. Rather than support absolute 
conservation, Vivir Bien advances the notion of maintenance and regeneration of life while 
valuing thoughtful and sustainable development. The wealth of natural resources in Bolivia is the 
wealth of all, and must be treated as such (Svampa 2019, 44). These ideas of collective wellbeing 
oppose the mode of development that dominated the 20th century and serve as another 
manifestation of anti-imperialism and nationalism in the country. Vivir Bien exists across the 
Andes region, particularly in Ecuador, another nation that adopted radical environmental 
legislation protecting the rights of nature (Postero 2017, 95).  
 The state frequently posits Vivir Bien as a development model supporting a generous 
social safety net that uplifts indigenous communities. A class-based perspective is useful to 
understanding how those who face the brunt of environmental consequences from climate 
change and extractive megaprojects might support state action. While indigenous groups are on 
the frontlines of environmental damage, they often comprise Bolivia’s poorest classes. Bearing 
the brunt of the contamination burden, these groups also receive the largest fraction of 
redistributive programs (Lalander and Lembke 2018, 641). Cash transfer programs allow natural 
resource revenues to directly reach the population. Although Bolivian programs like the 
Juancinto Pinto transfer for school-age children are not means-tested, they are progressive in that 
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poorer families utilize the public system at a higher rate than wealthier families (McGuire 2013, 
15).  
Moreover, between Juancinto Pinto and Juana Azurduy, the poorest half of the population 
received 60% of the programs’ benefits (15). Of impoverished people in Bolivia, 18.2% are 
indigenous persons facing extreme poverty, living off less than $1.90USD each day (UN News 
2020). Therefore, a large fraction of the Bolivian and particularly indigenous population rely 
heavily on the state, regardless of the weight of environmental burden placed on these groups. 
The harming actor gives the injured group welfare, and a transactional relationship emerges. In 
this way, the MAS government rejects Vivir Bien in practice, as the choice between ethno-
environmentalism and welfare funded by development is mutually exclusive (Lalander and 
Lembke 2018, 637). Members of indigenous tribes face a “Catch-22,” weighing the relative 
benefits between the two essential aspects of their livelihoods: sustain a stable lifestyle, or 
protect the environment in which one lives (636).   
Indigenous groups also articulate ethno-environmentalism, as the merging of discourses 
existed long before the MAS’s rise to power. Indigenous people have been organizing around 
environmental issues for decades, aware firsthand of their vulnerability to the damaging effects 
of environmental exploitation (Postero 2017, 102). Extractive megaprojects like open-pit mining 
and expansion of the agricultural frontier contaminate soil, streams, and groundwater. Such 
contamination disperses far from the pollution’s source, harming many aspects of natural 
ecological processes. Moreover, the expansion of extractive projects raises questions of the state 
asserting its representative status above all else. By acting as the primary negotiator of projects, 
the state considers itself the main entity promoting ethno-environmentalism and in doing such 
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claims to speak for all its constituents. It negotiates contracts for environmental havens with the 
outside world while at times denying indigenous nations within its political boundaries a voice.  
 Indigenous ontologies are deeply connected to respect, protection, and sustainable use of 
the environment. More than a series of state-led decrees, ethno-environmentalism merges 
discourses and attitudes and encompasses a spectrum of ideas. Vivir Bien both guides indigenous 
plans for sustainable development and acts as a useful tool for promoting a progressive agenda 
on the international front.  
Economic Constraints 
Any new evaluative framework must consider the economic context of its subject. Over 
the course of Evo Morales’ presidency GDP per capita has doubled and poverty rates have fallen. 
Given this relative growth in income and development, questions remain as to how this came to 
be and what implications it has on governing decisions. Are state actors really constrained in 
their decision-making by commodity prices? I find that the progressive rhetoric and policy action 
of resource nationalism best explain the economic context and subsequent decision-making by 
the MAS. Structural forces cannot be considered an independent variable for development 
decisions made by the government. Instead, resource nationalism should be understood as the 
primary constraint on governance, regardless of market commodity prices. When commodity 
prices are high, the desire to capitalize further upon gains increases, and thus the desirability of 
resource nationalization increases. When commodity prices are low, resource nationalist ideals 
encourage state-led development. Understanding resource nationalism as the constraining 
variable rather than global commodity price fluctuations explains why unpopular decision-
making still occurs in cases like the TIPNIS despite a strong commodity market. 
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From the turn of the millennium until at least 2014, Latin American development was 
mainly based on large-scale primary exports and rising commodity prices. With this commodity 
boom, the period saw prices of energy and mineral exports rapidly increase due to emerging 
importer markets in Brazil and much of Asia, particularly China. After decades of stagnation, 
this market boom boosted economies across the region. Maristella Svampa (2019) classifies the 
era as the commodities consensus, an era of Latin American exports and expansion of 
consumption. These economic conditions brought a number of advantages and positive 
externalities. In Bolivia, this productivist vision of development became dominant. As one of the 
most natural resource-rich countries on Earth, the Bolivian government enjoyed how the boom 
generated foreign currency for the state. While neoliberal effects such as mine closure and water 
privatization contributed to rural and urban income loss, Morales moved Bolivia from a 
neoliberal model firmly towards state-led development under an assertion of resource 
nationalism. Resource nationalism arguments combine analysis of populist rhetoric and 
economic indicators, revealing that there are few clear effects of global commodity prices (and 
their subsequent fall) on Bolivian development.  
Broadly speaking, resource nationalism exerts sovereignty over natural resources that fall 
within the borders of the state. In economic terms, governments may choose to nationalize entire 
industries or sectors, typically oil and gas, with the goal of increasing state revenues. Extraction 
then operates through state-owned enterprises. The Bolivian case differs slightly from this 
narrative, opting for a heterodox economic strategy. On May 1, 2006, Evo Morales announced 
the nationalization of the hydrocarbons industry. Exactly one year later, he declared all national 
territory to be a public mining reserve. These actions were not as extreme as the rhetoric and 
press attention surrounding them would imply. Rather than true expropriation of foreign assets, 
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nationalization in Bolivia consisted of renegotiations with multinational companies. 
Renegotiations increased taxes and royalty rates on extraction by foreign enterprises that directly 
fed government accounts by increasing resource rents. The government sought to control the 
commercialization of its natural resources by altering contracts with its primary hydrocarbon 
importers like Petrobras from Brazil and Argentinian enterprises. Part of this “nationalization” 
also included reviving and refounding the state-owned gas company Yacimientos Petrolíferos 
Fiscales Bolivianos (YPFB). Economists found this nationalization endeavor to be a success as 
government revenue increased from $731 million USD in 2006 to $4.95 billion in 2014 (Arauz 
et. al. 2019, 8). Such an increase in revenue cannot be attributed to commodity price increases, as 
Figure 6 below shows that global prices peaked in the year nationalization was first enacted. 
These revenues contributed to economic stability and funded social welfare projects like cash 
transfers for children and the elderly. In addition, they raised the minimum wage which has 
subsequently lowered the number of people facing extreme poverty in the country.  
Many authors consider path-dependent effects when analyzing the Bolivian economic 
context. Under a path dependency framework, previous decisions and sociopolitical processes 
shape subsequent ones, complicating economic diversification. I argue that past rhetoric of 
resource nationalism stemming back to the Gas War preceding the 2006 election of Evo Morales 
necessarily inhibits future action by the state. During the gas conflict, social actors including the 
MAS called for an end to foreign gas exploitation and the reassertion of the state in the 
hydrocarbons industry. Connecting foreign exploitation to narratives of dispossession during the 
gas conflicts established the basis for nationalization once the MAS won power. Just one 
hundred days into his presidency, Morales ordered the nationalization of oil and gas and thus the 
reassertion of sovereignty over natural resources within Bolivia’s borders away from 
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multinational companies (Morales 2006). This was a decision largely done to achieve a populist 
vision of reasserting the people versus the (foreign) elites. Resource nationalism was a direct 
break with IMF prescriptions which called for strengthening decentralization processes, cutting 
state spending, and adhering to market trends. The original decision to pursue state-led 
development comes from the promises and implementation of resource nationalism, not by an 
analysis of optimal commodity prices. 
Resource rents climbed throughout the start of the 2000s but peaked in 2006, with natural 
resource rents accounting for 14.93% of the GDP. While Bolivia enjoyed relatively high rents 
until an intense dip in 2015, resource rents cannot explain the full story due to the 2008 global 
recession. With 2009 rents dipping drastically to 8.17%, true commodity-based constraints 
would imply a change in development strategy according to material forces like a recession. 
Bolivia remained steadfast regardless of resource rent income levels. The recession did not affect 
the nation’s overall economy as officials implemented effective countercyclical measures. 
Moreover, resource rents were quickly recovered. Their value fluctuation did not impact choices 
made by the MAS. Around the time of the TIPNIS conflict in 2011, rents were indeed on the up, 
meaning the government was enjoying a relative surplus of income as context for decisions. 
There was no incentive to begin highway building or exploratory projects in protected areas. The 
MAS did not propose building the San Ignacio de Moxos highway through a protected area out 
of concern for national income. Rents have not created broad-based development in Bolivia, yet 
arguments assuming they are responsible for low economic growth miss how political decisions 




Figure 6. Total natural resource rents of Bolivia expressed as percent of GDP.  
 Adding to the argument that material forces cannot be the primary reason behind 
decisions made by Morales and the MAS, most of Morales’ presidency was not actually marked 
by extreme growth in commodity prices. As shown in Figure 7 below, the 2008 global recession 
marked the end of the true height of the boom. From 2009 onwards, there has been a net decline 
in natural gas prices. Evo was only entering his second of what would become three terms in 
office when this dip began. The commodity boom and bust clearly does not dictate choices in 
governance. Moreover, external debts remain consistently low throughout the MAS’s time in 
power. Figure 8 indicates that while in 2006 more than half the country’s GDP was external debt 
(54.6%), in the years following the debt has stayed below 40%, averaging at 32.3% of total GDP. 
Such consistency negates an argument for debt fueling and/or constraining decisions. Although 
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Bolivia is frequently grouped with countries that suffer from the resource curse of economic 
underperformance and overabundance of natural resources, in reality, the nation has shown 
steady improvement on many economic and social indicators.  
 
Figure 7. Producer price index by commodity: Natural gas.  
 
Figure 8. External debt of Bolivia as percentage of GDP.  
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Resource nationalism is the primary constraint on the Bolivian government. The 
hydrocarbons industry nationalization in 2006 stirred not only economic sentiment but political 
and social support from a wide array of domestic actors. Such a policy move and surrounding 
rhetoric set the course for the next decade and beyond. The desire to reassert sovereignty 
sustained future policy choices, not external market forces. Resource nationalism creates a clash 
between the aggressive, pro-development ideology of the political left and indigenous 
communities that support reassertion of sovereignty yet oppose state economic intervention at all 
costs. Many scholars support this idea. In her later work, Linda Farthing (2019) argues that the 
MAS has been a political project rather than an economic one. She too sees policy actions as 
more autonomous from material forces. Under Morales, Bolivian society changed drastically in a 
sociopolitical manner, but less occurred terms of structural change. 
Interestingly, the MAS refutes any path-dependent argument. This is unsurprising when a 
populist lens is applied, as populist leaders and administrations seek to distance themselves from 
all prior action, even from a history they created. The MAS seeks to brand each policy decision 
as fully unique. Regarding the TIPNIS conflict, in the official state rebuke, former Vice 
President Álvaro García Linera contributes to a resource-nationalist argument, stating that the 
TIPNIS highway building project is strictly a nationalist project: it is not part of any regional 
development plans and is anti-imperialist in nature (García Linera 2013, 29). The goal of the 
project is to ultimately bring about the nationalization of the Bolivian Amazon. I view this 
perspective as path-dependent, again based on resource nationalism. Once the state asserted such 
a discourse it was necessarily going to impact all future choices.  
This economic contextualization and discussion shows that in the Bolivian case, 
neoliberal market forces did not restrict decision-makers. Evo Morales and the MAS make 
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choices freely, dependent only on their past resource nationalism. While the rise and fall of 
commodity prices at the start of the 21st century had some impact, their influence is markedly 
less than some researchers contend.  
Contradictions Intensify: The TIPNIS Conflict 
After a relatively peaceful first term in power, Evo Morales and the MAS had seemingly 
succeeded transforming the state. They had nationalized hydrocarbons, renegotiated greater 
profits for the state, implemented a broad social welfare program, and adopted greater respect for 
indigenous peoples in rhetoric and legislation. Bolivia solidified its place in the world order as an 
ethnic and environmental haven with economic prosperity and increased visibility of the long-
marginalized indigenous communities. Still, by 2011 the country faced complex and widespread 
socioenvironmental conflict over the announcement of a highway-building project through the 
Isiboro Sécure National Park and Indigenous Territory (TIPNIS), a protected area home to a 
number of indigenous people and vast amounts of biodiversity. The MAS continued to use 
resource nationalist and populist tropes to defend the invasive project, many of the indigenous 
coalitions that brought the party to power emerged as strong opponents to the highway. As the 
MAS attempted to justify the project, the unified bloc of indigenous interests dissolved. The 
reactions, intersections, and divergences of these interest groups over time illustrate a functional 
coming together of populism, resource nationalism, and ethno-environmentalism. Evo Morales 
negates the ethnic aspect of his populism as the conflict evolves, prioritizing economic growth 
above all.  
Interests of the MAS 
Like many populist parties, the MAS’s interests throughout the duration of the TIPNIS 
conflict exemplify one set of interests in principle and a conflicting set of interests in practice. 
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Although resource nationalism aims to blend issues of natural resource governance with state 
sovereignty, the MAS took the concept one step further by attempting to implement such a 
nationalism within a plurinational state. Asserting plurinationalism in some settings and a 
singular, ideologically homogeneous state in others leads the MAS to contradict many of its 
original promises. In principle, the MAS frequently asserts ideas of Vivir Bien (Living Well) and 
concretizes these ideals in constitutional legislation. Yet when faced with internal conflict over 
the use of natural resources, the government tends to desert those ideals. Charting legal and 
political communication, I demonstrate how the MAS prioritized the economic side of resource 
nationalism over sovereignty and self-determination discourses due to the allure of 
developmentalism. 
Setting the stage: Government-led environmentalism 
 The TIPNIS conflict has roots in a number of social issues, many of which predate Evo 
Morales and the MAS. Still, their rise to power corresponded with a reassertion of indigeneity in 
political life, a renewal that empowered rural and indigenous coalitions to defend their rights. 
Evo’s first term mainly revolved around transforming electoral rhetoric into actual governance. 
For the purposes of this thesis, the first critical piece of legislation to examine that reveals the 
MAS’s interests is Supreme Decree 28701, or the executive order to nationalize the 
hydrocarbons industry. The 2006 nationalization decree, while not outright related to the 
indigenous peoples of the TIPNIS, evokes themes of dispossession. It opens with the 
consideration of historical struggle, stating that “the people have won at the cost of their blood, 
the right that our hydrocarbon wealth returns to the hands of the nation'' (Morales 2006, 2). A 
strong beginning, the declaratory sentence connects bloodshed to hydrocarbon wealth, 
particularly to devastating wars in the 1930s in which the country ceded strategic territory. 
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Moreover, use of “the people'' signals a reference to the same people who elected Morales to 
power. As an executive decree, much of the order’s language reflects ethnopopulist campaign 
styles. Here, side-by-side, Morales connects the people to the nation’s natural resources. The 
Decree proclaims that hydrocarbons are national assets and deems all existing contracts 
unconstitutional (2). Reflecting the spectacular nature of populism, Evo describes the 
privatization of the state oil company YPFB as an “act of treason” because it gave away national 
sovereignty to foreign powers (3). The text of the decree claims it is a full nationalization, but 
then describes a case-by-case negotiation process. From the start, the MAS closely combined 
elements of resource nationalism and populism. By including themes of territorial dispossession 
at the decree’s beginning, Morales indicates a regard for his population’s indigenous heritage. 
 Delivering on promises for a refounding of the state, the MAS presented a new 
constitution in 2009, which handily passed a public referendum. The constitution expands the 
rights of all Bolivians, explicitly increasing the visibility of its indigenous populations. With the 
goal of building a new state, the document presents radical themes of indigenous autonomy and 
environmentalism as the basis of the nation. Still, the constitution includes conflicting language 
on land and territory that only heightens tensions as the TIPNIS conflict evolves. A content 
analysis shows that unity, sovereignty, natural resources, environment, indigeneity, and related 
terms appear most frequently throughout the document. On a simple search metric, ‘indígena/s’ 
appears 130 times, more than double the appearances of unity or natural resources. The preamble 
sets out a key contrast between the prior neoliberal era and the new plurinational state, governed 
by the MAS in conjunction with the people (Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia 2009, 7). Chapter 
One discusses the concept of pluralism in economic, political, legal, cultural, and linguistic terms 
(11). This pluralism is the natural continuation of inclusive populism. With Spanish and 35 
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indigenous languages all recognized as official, the constitution implies an easy coexistence of 
the many nations within the Bolivian border. After a discussion of inclusive founding principles, 
the constitution then describes the refounding of the state based on decolonization. Article 9 calls 
for the responsible use of natural resources and the promotion of their industrialization (14). 
Interestingly, this is embedded and somewhat hidden among a listing of the state’s fundamental 
values and purposes. 
 In terms of rights and guarantees, Article 30 is entirely dedicated to rights of indigenous 
peoples and nations. These peoples are guaranteed the right to self-determination and 
territoriality, and to the protection of their sacred places (24-25). Point 15 of that same Article 
describes the right to prior consultation in good faith. The right to benefit from the exploitation 
of natural resources in indigenous territories follows (25). These two points taken together have 
great importance in the TIPNIS conflict, as the right to benefit becomes a common defense of 
harmful extractive practices. The 2009 constitution aims to develop a concept of government-led 
environmentalism. Article 342 says it is a duty of both state and people to protect natural 
resources and biodiversity (162). Beyond that concept, the constitution promises that “the State 
and society shall promote the mitigation of harmful effects to the environment” (162). Again, a 
contradiction arises in Article 348, which states that natural resources are of strategic interest to 
the development of the country (164). Under this logic, environmental exploitation is permissible 
so long as the Bolivian people have access to the economic benefits. This line of thought 
assumes that all people value economic gain over the environment. Article 390 expresses that the 
Bolivian Amazon should have special protection and introduces the concept of “desarrollo 
integral” or integral development, an idea that the MAS heavily promotes in future legislation 
(177). The constitution’s chapter on the Amazon rounds out the entire document, demonstrating 
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that the issue and ecosystem is top of mind for the government even before the emergence of 
widespread unrest. The constitution, while radical in comparison to other founding documents of 
nations worldwide, never addresses the how the indigeneity so widely celebrated in the opening 
chapters can coexist with the integral development concept elucidated as the text concludes. 
Attempting to mix these themes works for rhetorical purposes, but inconsistencies emerge in 
legislation.  
 Also in 2009, the MAS approved a 415 million dollar loan from the Brazilian national 
development bank (BNDES) to finance the construction of the Villa Tunari–San Ignacio de 
Moxos highway (La Razón Digital 2011). The highway project would create infrastructure in a 
long-untouched region, the TIPNIS, opening the Bolivian Amazon to travel, transport, and 
perhaps more cynically, to extractivism and exploitation of resources. Home to a vast array of 
flora and fauna, the area has come under siege in recent years by illegal loggers. Critics worried 
that paving a road would only facilitate the intensification of such logging, in addition to the 
deforestation that must occur inherently for a road to be built.  
 By 2010, turmoil in the TIPNIS was simmering, but the state continued to output 
legislation that promoted environmental principles. Law 71 of 2010, the “Rights of Mother 
Earth,” sought to recognize the rights of nature as an obligation of both the State and society (La 
Asamblea Legislativa Nacional 2010, 1). Based on the principles of harmony, regeneration, Vivir 
Bien, and non-commercialization, the law considers Mother Earth as sacred, and addresses the 
deep interconnectedness all people have with nature. Article 8 presents the obligations of the 
state, namely to develop public policies that uphold the rights of nature and to create forms of 
production and consumption patterns that prevent overexploitation and allow people to live well 
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(4-5). Article 9 encourages an active public — the same public that later faces repression when 
upholding the ideals of this law.  
Conflict arises: The MAS response in principle 
 As indigenous groups united to engage in collective action opposing the TIPNIS highway 
project, the MAS’s response contradicts many of the principles laid out in key documents such as 
the 2009 constitution and Law 71. As conflict intensifies, the MAS’s official political 
communication outputs show a prioritization of resource nationalism and populist ideals, 
eschewing the indigeneity and related worldviews as expressed in legislation. Vice President 
Alvaro García Linera is a noted Marxist scholar who produced much of the official response to 
the crisis in the TIPNIS. In a book-length essay titled Geopolitics of the Amazon, García Linera 
refutes many key criticisms of the TIPNIS project. He starts by using a number of geopolitical 
arguments, emphasizing the historical need for a road connecting isolated parts of the country 
(García Linera 2013, 17). Foreign intervention and despotism are central themes relayed by the 
MAS that García Linera perpetuates (6). He states that “the major enemy of the presence of the 
protector state in the Amazon region at present is the international imperial-corporate structure” 
(19). The Vice President continually relies on imperialists as the Other in contrast to the 
protector state that is the political instrument of the people. Colonialism is at the root of his 
criticism, an attempt to connect indigenous demands of sovereignty and the assertion of self-
determination as purported by the constitution to control over resources. Colonialism becomes a 
convenient trope to undercut legitimate arguments made in opposition to the state by indigenous 
people. García Linera blames outsiders when the real issue is internal. He refutes conservationist 
arguments, stating that a lack of state development in the area would be submitting to imperialist 
desires (10). Instead of acknowledging the demands of Bolivians, García Linera focuses his 
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response on the criticisms of the TIPNIS conflict made by outsiders. The response shows the 
importance of a developmentalist narrative for a leftist vision, with the opposition cast as 
neocolonial and an obstacle necessary to overcome.  
 As the conflict unfolded, newspaper articles provide timely evidence for the evolution of 
government policy. In July 2011, Evo Morales stated “whether they like it or not, we will build 
that road” (Collyns 2017). Morales uses “they” to posture that opposition comes from outside the 
inclusive, populist base he worked to build. On August 4, 2011, Morales argued that “say[ing] 
that no one has ever arrived [in the TIPNIS], is false. Logging businessmen have already 
removed wood for the entire Isiboro Sécure” (La Razón 2011a). Just days prior, Morales 
announced that the road would go forward regardless of the consultation results, although they 
would be considered (La Razón, 2011b). His steadfastness shows a clear prioritization of 
resource nationalism and economic growth above all, particularly after he admitted the 
consultation would not be binding per se.  
Response in practice 
Turmoil in the summer of 2011 continued into the fall months, creating the first true 
crisis of governance for the MAS. On September 25, 2011, reports emerged that 500 police 
attacked indigenous protesters at their camp at Chaparina (Achtenberg 2011). After being invited 
to resume negotiations with the government while marching in protest of the highway project, 
protesters were beaten, gagged, and arrested en masse. The violent repression brought 
widespread condemnation, and led to the resignations of Defense Minister Cecilia Chacón and 
Minister of the Interior Sacha Llorenti (Achtenberg 2011). After silence from Morales in the first 
24 hours, the president stated that he did not order nor condone the police actions. No one in 
government has taken responsibility for giving the police orders to break up the camps, and there 
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has been a noteworthy lack of discourse in general about the violation of indigenous protesters’ 
rights.  
Legislation materialized in the wake of the protests and the Chaparina massacre. Law 180 
of October 2011 emerged as a direct response to the events in the TIPNIS. It acknowledges the 
TIPNIS as home to the Chimán, Yuracaré, and Mojeño-trinitario people (La Asamblea 
Legislativa Nacional 2011, 2). Most importantly, Law 180 declares the TIPNIS a “zona 
intangible,” or untouchable, and says the highway will not cross the TIPNIS (2). While a victory 
on the surface, most indigenous actors did not desire absolute conservation as it prohibits all 
economic activity within the untouchable zone. Absolute conservation or an untouchable 
designation also prohibits any new human settlements within the territory. Deeming the area 
untouchable was not in good faith — the MAS knew it was not the optimal outcome for any 
party. It was also not a compromise. Law 180 is an avoidance of the problem and a denial of 
valid and constructive criticisms. By promoting absolute conservation, the state no longer 
engages with a public conflict that tests the limits of progressive governance in a resource-rich 
state like Bolivia.  
The state continued to promote legislation surrounding the TIPNIS. Law 222 of February 
2012 legislates the free, prior, and informed consent (FPIC) process to the people of the TIPNIS, 
calling on both the 2009 constitution as well as international doctrines like the International 
Labor Organization Convention 169 and the United Nations Declaration of the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples (La Asamblea Legislativa Nacional 2012, 1). One of the primary issues of 
the consultation process would be the issue of the TIPNIS’ untouchable nature. If the consulted 
groups deem any activity acceptable, development projects like the Villa Tunari–San Ignacio de 
Moxos highway could be permitted.  
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In October 2012, the state began explicitly promoting development as a way to achieve 
Vivir Bien. Law 300 expands the rights of Mother Earth doctrine and defines fundamental 
concepts of Living Well and Integral Development. It places Vivir Bien in contrast to the rights 
of Earth, as though they are not naturally compatible items. The law is concerned with ensuring 
balance while allowing environmental measures and development to occur, a major revision 
from its 2010 predecessor, Law 71. Article 5 provides the definitions of concepts used 
throughout the MAS’s tenure that had been kept indefinite until this point. Living Well “is the 
civilizing and cultural horizon alternative to capitalism and modernity that is born in the 
worldviews of the nations of native indigenous peoples” (La Asamblea Legislativa Nacional 
2012, 7). The MAS speaks for its indigenous populations through this definition yet offers no 
indication that groups were consulted when crafting a definition that explains their specific 
perspectives. Living Well exists along social, cultural, political, economic, ecological, and 
affective dimensions (7). A primary concern of progressive governments is the welfare of its 
people, and Vivir Bien encapsulates those desires within an indigenous philosophical framework. 
The MAS’s mention of indigeneity in law signals an awareness by the party of the identity’s 
utility, especially in mobilizing support for policies. Law 300 also defines “Integral Development 
to Live Well” as a continuous process of “generation and implementation of social measures and 
actions...for the creation, provision, and strengthening of conditions, capacities, and material, 
social, and spiritual means” (7). This law situates integral development within ethnic practices 
and frameworks. It keeps the functional mixing of these two elements vague again, as in reality 
the Chaparina violence and fallout on the domestic and international fronts had already taken 
place. The government essentially revises the original Earth bill, Law 71, and inserts 
development goals side by side with the environmental initiatives.  
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The MAS on the International Front 
 As these events unfolded, Evo Morales continued to be active in the global arena, 
presenting numerous speeches at international institutions. His speeches at the UN highlight 
themes of imperialism, resource nationalism, peaceful settlements, and human rights, yet 
noticeably refrain from covering indigeneity and indigenous rights outside of a discourse 
critiquing foreign intervention. In 2011, Morales spoke about global wealth inequality and 
poverty, remarking that “imperialism seeks to control the sources of energy throughout the 
world” (Morales 2011, 11). He focuses his address on imperialism and intervention, shying away 
from a discussion of the power struggle over energy resources taking place within his own 
borders. In order to “free” Bolivia, he says that “[Bolivia’s] natural resources can never be 
privatized. They can never be handed over to transnational companies'' (12). Throughout the 
speech, Morales uses first person “we” and “our,” relying on populist style even on the 
international front. His speech is largely revisionist, stating that “we nationalized and recovered” 
the country’s natural resources, implying they were saved. That “saving” largely conflicts with 
the intended deforestation and destruction of the Amazon for the proposed infrastructure project. 
He concludes his speech with mention of “the constant struggle of peoples for dignity and 
sovereignty” (13) but regarding a United States military base, not the actual struggles taking 
place at the same time. Note the dates: the violence at Chaparina took place just four days after 
the UN speech, right in the midst of the Eighth Indigenous March, a march in protest from the 
TIPNIS to the capital, La Paz. In his 2012 speech to the UN General Assembly, Morales again 
negates domestic conflict, focusing on populist ideas of imperialism. He declared, “in truth, I do 
not understand it when the presidents who speak in defense of human rights are never the ones 
who respect humans, either within or outside their own countries” (Morales 2012, 13). 
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Criticizing foreign leaders has always been a huge part of Morales’ platform. Anti-imperialist 
rhetoric distracts leaders and his own public from making valid critiques.  
 Adding irony to his quote from the 2012 UN General Assembly, in August 2013, human 
rights NGO Amnesty International filed a report to the United Nations Human Rights 
Committee, alleging excessive use of force by police during the violence at Chaparina in 2011. 
The report details hundreds of police obstructing peaceful protesters in the Beni department, 
using “excessive and indiscriminate tear gas and truncheons” on unarmed protesters (Amnesty 
International 2013, 19). The report documents 70 injured people and 200-300 detainees. It also 
describes attacks on doctors who joined the march (19). These actions violated UN principles on 
the use of force. Moreover, the Amnesty report highlights the conflict in the TIPNIS and the 
consultation process, arguing that the right to FPIC was not respected in Bolivia (25). While 
Bolivia has ratified key international conventions on prior consultation, Amnesty argued that the 
government had made its decision about the road ever since the MAS rose to power in 2006, 
without input from indigenous peoples (27). Certain aspects of the TIPNIS project and its 
legislation were not adequately explained during the consultation process, creating a “climate of 
mistrust” (29). A consultation done in good faith cannot take place under such hostile conditions. 
The findings of the report exemplify resource nationalism at the expense of key constituents. The 
TIPNIS exposes the cracks in Morales’ united front.  
Conflict continues 
 In the years after the prior consultation, conflict has quieted, but not disappeared 
altogether. Morales and the MAS continue to bring up the project and draft new legislation. After 
the passage of Law 300, in 2017 the government again updated TIPNIS rules, creating Law 969. 
The law erases previous rulings, again opening up the TIPNIS to development projects. Using 
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the guise of “integral development,” the bill aims to support similar principles to Law 300 and 
prior, yet supposedly includes the results of the prior consultation. Still, the law focuses on 
sustainable development, a marked change from the conservation and rights of Mother Nature 
developed in earlier rules. Article 8 says the state will promote sustainable development projects 
that support key basic needs, like health and education (La Asamblea Legislativa Nacional 2017, 
3). From the MAS’s earliest days, the party billed the premise of funding a progressive policy 
agenda through extractive development as complementary. As conflict devolved, the issues with 
such an economic model became clear. Article 9 confirms the intent of the MAS to open up the 
territory, based on “improving the rights of indigenous peoples” (3). Few other times does the 
party get as explicit as stating the permissibility of “free movement, through the opening of local 
roads, highways, river navigation systems, and others” (3). Law 969 blatantly allows for the 
highway building project once more. Ten years after the nationalization, Article 10 of Law 969 
advances the ability of private development activities (4). The language specifies that “the 
development of productive activities may be carried out with the participation of private parties, 
provided that there are agreements...with the indigenous peoples of the TIPNIS” (4). The article 
does not mention a full FPIC process, only calling for “agreements” that include a favorable 
percentage of the profit for indigenous groups. Keeping the specifics of “favorable” vague, Law 
969 strays far from the original environmental legislation promoted during Morales’ first and 
second terms. By 2017, Morales faced mounting criticisms and electoral conflict.  
Indigenous Interests 
While a combination of populism, resource nationalism, and performance of indigeneity 
helped Evo Morales and the MAS reach power, as economic priorities for the government 
shifted, the party largely discarded indigenous interests. With the announcement of a 
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construction agreement with Brazilian multinational OAS in 2008, infrastructure and extractive 
projects have threatened the populations living in protected areas. In the TIPNIS, indigenous 
groups have had to organize and collectivize their visions and demands to counter the hardening 
of the MAS’s developmentalist stance. Still, indigenous peoples do not have homogenous 
understandings on all issues, as evidenced by diverging alliances during the conflict. The MAS’s 
all-or-nothing approach to the Villa Tunari–San Ignacio de Moxos highway project exacerbated 
existing tensions between indigenous preferences and MAS priorities. Indigenous coalitions and 
leaders argue that values of environmentalism and respect for Mother Earth, as dictated in 
Bolivian law, are disregarded by the state. Throughout the conflict, power dynamics shift as 
indigenous groups use different strategies to have their demands heard both domestically and 
globally. This section aims to illuminate indigenous interests that exist and evolve alongside the 
official state communication and legislation discussed above.  
A hopeful alliance 
 In the years before Evo Morales’ initial presidential victory, indigenous and rural 
workers’ organizations converged to form an alliance in support of indigenous and agrarian 
rights. The Unity Pact is a fluid confederation of grassroots organizations throughout Bolivia, 
concerned with environmentalism, agriculture, and a generally redistributive political agenda 
(Prada 2010). While membership has shifted over time, five key groups ground the Pact, many of 
which formed during the emergence of the modern indigenous movement in Latin America in 
the 1980s. La Confederación Nacional de Mujeres Campesinas Indígenas Originarias de Bolivia 
“Bartolina Sisa” (CNMCIOB) stems from women’s indigenous unions and is primarily 
concerned with women’s equality in Bolivia. Their mission statement stresses concern with 
capitalistic destruction and how the rich have strayed from indigenous cosmovisions 
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(CNMCIOB 2021). La Confederación Sindical Única de Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia 
(CSUTCB) seeks territorial integrity, a true pluralist society, and sustainable management of 
natural resources (CSUTCB 2021). The organization is rooted in rural workers’ trade unions, 
with a specifically campesino base (as opposed to strictly indigenous). La Confederación 
Sindical de Comunidades Interculturales Originarias de Bolivia (“Interculturales”) is another 
specifically campesino organizing community (CSIOB 2021). From Bolivia’s lowlands come the 
National Council of Ayllus and Markas del Qullasuyu (CONAMAQ) and the Confederación de 
Pueblos Indígenas de Bolivia (CIDOB), both created to combat the historical marginalization of 
specifically lowland indigenous people. The bases of these groups, both territorially and 
ethnically, becomes important as conflict develops.  
 The Unity Pact was closely allied with the MAS throughout Morales’ first term, engaging 
the state on a variety of topics like land reform, and the incorporation of Vivir Bien into law. As 
a movement-based party, the MAS aimed to utilize its grassroots origins. The Unity Pact drafted 
legislation specifically pertaining to the defense of the environment in Bolivia, citing concerns 
about contamination stemming from deforestation and desertification, both of which are 
exacerbated by the climate crisis (Prada 2010). The effects of the climate crisis, including 
heightened weather events such as droughts and flooding, put indigenous and rural peoples, 
frequently the most vulnerable populations in a nation, in a state of emergency. While the Unity 
Pact evolved in ideology over time, its original positioning showed great concern for the 
environment. The core of indigenous concerns as represented by the Pact revolve around 
predatory practices both by the state and by transnational corporations. 
 After the adoption of the 2009 constitution, indigenous communities had ample cause to 
be optimistic about the transformation of state practices in the natural world. The new 
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constitution promised heightened indigenous visibility and political and cultural pluralism. 
Moreover, it embedded concepts of ethno-environmentalism into law. With newfound hope, the 
Unity Pact drafted their own proposed version of what would become the Law of Mother Earth, 
Law 71. The Draft Law aimed to realize deep respect for the planet, and provide a new 
understanding of relationships between state, Earth, capital, and society. The preamble invokes 
the earth goddess Pachamama and ideas of Mother Earth while describing metaphysical concepts 
and the interconnection between all living beings (CSUTCB et. al. 2010, 1). It explicitly 
repudiates the concept of natural resources, as the term “manifests the relationships of 
dispossession of nature by the capitalist world-system” (1). As a draft law, it was unlikely the 
MAS would adopt language like this as it stands entirely contrary to the party’s strategy of 
resource nationalism. Although the Unity Pact was still closely aligned with the government at 
this point in 2010, the draft law illuminates certain divergences between the two groups. The 
radical core of the draft law calls for epistemological displacement and the decentering of human 
beings from life (2). With heavy criticism of productivist mindsets, the indigenous drafters 
highlight the incompatibility of accumulation built on indigenous dispossession (3). The MAS 
rejects this analysis, emphasizing the benefits of capital accumulation for the wider public, 
particularly for impoverished indigenous populations. The Unity Pact stresses the collective 
dimensions of the global ecological crisis and the need to move away from unsustainable 
models. The Draft Law highlights indigenous ontologies that largely fall flat in actual legislation 
passed by the MAS.  
 The project contains a number of objectives revolving around defense of Mother Earth, 
promoting balance, and combating climate change. In terms of actionable changes, the draft calls 
for the implementation of public policies that guarantee sustainable management within a 
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framework of Vivir Bien (6). It proposes the creation of a management office with the mandate 
of environmental protection, and stresses the need to implement a precautionary principle into 
development legislation. It also stresses the importance of the right to prior consultation under 
ILO Convention 169. The document lists fourteen rights of Mother Earth, a list with such 
breadth that its adoption is hard to imagine. Rights include lack of genetic modification of plants, 
about maintaining identity, and even the right to “not be affected by hydroelectric megaprojects, 
of infrastructure and development that affect the balance of ecosystems” (16). These rights are 
conspicuously missing in the approved legislation, but in November 2010, the Unity Pact 
believed in the state’s willingness to respect indigeneity in a way no government had done prior. 
Indigenous persuasive capacity at this time was believed to be quite high due to the MAS’s 
respect of the indigenous governing organizations and its apparent willingness to work with 
these organizations in a democratic and non-hierarchical way.  
Shattered trust and protests 
 The state adopted Law 71, titled the “Rights of Mother Earth,” in December 2010, 
supposedly based on the Draft Law presented a month prior. While the draft document gave 
exact recommendations and rights, Law 71 largely blurred the language, speaking only loosely 
about obligations of the state. Most noticeably, Article 7, which lays out the fundamental rights 
of nature, only retained half of the fourteen rights dictated in the Unity Pact draft (La Asamblea 
Legislativa Nacional 2010, 3). While there are discussions of consumption patterns and 
exploitation, the rights leave out protection from extractive industry projects or infrastructure 




 With the signing of construction contracts and applications for development loans, the 
MAS’s intent to build the Villa Tunari–San Ignacio de Moxos highway through the TIPNIS 
became clear. As alliances shifted and trust diminished, indigenous leaders turned to the 
international front with their message to gain support and sympathy. A 2011 YouTube video 
titled Message from TIPNIS to the World garnered attention for the TIPNIS conflict and 
indigenous interests. In the video, two indigenous leaders discuss the government’s actions and 
reasons for preserving the TIPNIS. Justa Cabrera, a Guaraní leader, describes the TIPNIS as “the 
lung of the country, of Latin America, and of the world.” Given this video’s context and its 
global audience, Cabrera uses traditionalist language and romanticized images of nature in order 
to gain sympathy for the cause. While the MAS deploys indigeneity as a tool to promote its own 
agenda, indigenous people also emphasize their own traditionality to serve specific goals. While 
some indigenous tribe members may live in protected areas, in many ways, they assimilate into a 
broader Bolivian culture and attend public schools with national curriculums. Still, when 
attempting to heighten awareness of the conflict in the TIPNIS, leaders may dress in traditional 
garments and use stereotypical phrases to perform a palatable indigeneity that gains national and 
international attention. Emigo Poiché, another indigenous leader, denounces the abuse against 
indigenous people during the Eighth March. With emotional descriptors of government’s 
genuine abuse and, Poiché again gains sympathy for the movement, creating a better positioning 
for indigenous people and their demands. Indigenous movements sought new avenues for impact 
as their relationship with the state deteriorated.  
 As conflict escalated, concerns heightened over the highway’s potential to facilitate 
exploitation, illegal logging, and further settlements and destruction of the TIPNIS ecosystems. 
CIDOB and CONAMAQ of lowland TIPNIS origins set out to organize what would become the 
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Eighth Indigenous March for the Defense of the TIPNIS, and the Territories, Life, Dignity, and 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples. With the name and concept based on the 1990 March for Territory 
and Dignity, the Eighth March aimed to expose contradictions in the discourse of the MAS and 
explicitly oppose the infrastructure project (Fundación Tierra 2011). While the government 
claimed the highway route was the most efficient option, indigenous coalitions worried about the 
expanded access outsiders would have to the protected territory and the precedent it would set 
(Achtenberg 2011). A highly visible march from the TIPNIS to the capital city would force a 
dialogue with the state. The March lasted two months, covering vast elevation and weather 
changes, and protestors faced hostility at numerous points on their path (Fundación Tierra 2011).  
 The protestors’ demands revolved around the incompatibility of indigenous ontologies 
and extractive megaprojects (Guzmán 2012, 2). While the March reflected territorial insecurities 
of CIDOB and CONAMAQ, it also shed light on the cultural and political insecurities felt by 
these groups. Although indigenous people living within the TIPNIS already had roads and 
connections, the MAS intended for new connections on the development front. At its core, the 
March questioned the MAS’s development strategy, fearing the destruction of territory (3). 
Indigenous distrust of the state stems from Bolivia’s history of colonization and exploitation. 
Antidemocratic decision-making relegates the indigenous population back to a marginalized 
status in a country where they are the ethnic majority. Protestors feared not only destruction of 
territory but loss of communities outright (10). Tribes in colonized areas in the southern portion 
of the TIPNIS had been displaced by cocalero settlers and feared further ethnocide (11).  
 As a collective action, the March generated peaceful solidarity among many indigenous 
actors. The Eighth March followed the precedents set since 1990 which revolved around themes 
of political participation, sovereignty, and natural resource management. While some of the past 
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marches aligned with campesino movements, the Eighth March specifically evoked the same 
indigenous groups, similar demands, and the same walking path as the original March for 
Territory and Dignity more than twenty years prior (Guzmán 2012, 20). The March’s route has 
sociocultural significance as well. Following the 1990 route, walking the same path and facing 
hardships in a similar way to the original protestors was of great spiritual importance to these 
people (17). Evoking past marches connects the specific demands of aggrieved persons in the 
TIPNIS to a larger historical dialogue and debate in Bolivia. The Eighth March was a two-
month-long visibility campaign that underlined the importance of these issues to the organizing 
groups and heightened public engagement with the protected area. While the MAS discredited 
the march on the basis of “incomprehensible demands,” the dynamism and evolution of 
protestors’ demands show their adaptability and growing power. Protestors primarily organized 
around the immediate stoppage of the TIPNIS highway project, but the official list of sixteen 
demands included calls for security within indigenous territories from both internal and external 
threats, implementation of sustainable technologies to combat climate change, and the fulfillment 
of basic needs, particularly with regards to education. As the march continued, protestors 
coordinated their discourse surrounding these demands. 
 Marchers were met with extreme violence in September 2011 at Chaparina, where police 
used tear gas, beatings, and mass arrests to obstruct the March. Violent repression ordered by an 
unidentified state security force resolved to intimidate protestors both physically and 
psychologically (Guzmán 2012, 71). In terms of power dynamics, the Chaparina massacre 
represents a high point of indigenous power. Physical intimidation and trauma propelled 
protestors to recommit to their cause, with the march gaining more sympathy throughout the 
country. State-led oppression furthers solidarity and becomes a collective memory. The MAS’s 
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move further and further away from their original convictions strengthens the indigenous 
narrative of predation and destruction. The Eighth Indigenous March achieved its goal of 
stopping the highway project, as Morales signed Law 180 deeming the TIPNIS “untouchable” in 
October 2011. At the same time, the new designation outlawed all activity, including sustenance 
farming and small business within the defined territory. Indigenous groups had differing 
opinions on the efficacy of Law 180. A victory for some, the TIPNIS movement showed signs of 
major rift resulting from Law 180 and its implications.  
 In December 2011, a countermarch led by the Indigenous Council of the South 
(CONISUR) complicated the victory of Law 180 and assured the continuation of conflict in the 
TIPNIS. CONISUR represents 21 indigenous communities, primarily in the southern portion of 
the protected area, a section entirely within the Cochabamba department (Achtenberg 2012). 
Beyond indigenous tribes, CONISUR represents settlers who have moved into the TIPNIS to 
expand the coca farming economy. The group rejected Law 180 and area’s the untouchable 
because the highway would expand their access to markets across the country. Although living in 
the protected area, members of CONISUR with an organized economy dismiss traditionality and 
see it to their advantage that the MAS continues supporting them and the development of their 
area. The countermarch also represents the complexity of indigenous views as some tribes within 
CONISUR continued to align with the MAS.  
Resulting from divisions over Law 180, CIDOB and CONAMAQ split from the Unity 
Pact, dissolving a major alliance between indigenous and campesino organizations. The 
remaining Unity Pact members were primarily unionists and campesinos aligned with the MAS 
(Rojas 2013). The split occurred because of MAS actions involving the TIPNIS. President of 
CIDOB Adolfo Chávez even remarked that the pact had become merely a yes-man to the 
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government. By breaking the Pact, CIDOB and CONAMAQ signaled extreme displeasure with 
the evolution of the MAS in governance. The move showed organizational fortitude, as potential 
dangers accompanying resistance had already been revealed at Chaparina.  
The split groups sought to exercise their power and challenge the MAS majority after the 
CONISUR countermarch. In January 2012, five members of Congress moved to break with the 
MAS and form their own legislative bloc, an effort to force dialogue by ending the MAS’s two-
thirds majority (Corz and Condori 2012). With the members who split registered as MAS 
representatives, the state argued their shift was an ethics violation and threatened to report the 
members. Despite the Unity Pact rift, this break with the powerful ruling party by just five 
congress members shows indigenous peoples at their strongest. The varying capacities of the 
actors are laid bare and we see the true extent of indigenous organizing in politics. As a 
movement-based party, the MAS suffers the loss of its majority when it fails to adhere to the will 
of its constituents. By threatening and implementing a voting split from the ruling party, 
CONAMAQ and CIDOB win the indigenous coalition much more power, both electorally and 
psychologically. A highly visible split, the indigenous bloc of five legislators has the advantage 
of major national attention, and forces the MAS to debate and consider their demands in order to 
reach a two-thirds consensus.  
Consultation and consequences 
 The MAS doubled down on its conviction to push forward the TIPNIS project and 
reversed indigenous victories with the passage of Law 222, the Law of Consultation. The law 
reverses the “untouchable” language of Law 180, citing the need to decide on permissible 
development activities through a process of free, prior, and informed consent (La Asamblea 
Legislativa Nacional 2012, 1). CIDOB and other indigenous organizations planned a ninth 
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indigenous march to demand compliance with Law 180 and reveal the manipulation embedded 
in Law 222 (CIDOB and CNAMIB 2012,1). In an official communiqué, five groups denounce 
intimidation allegedly done by paramilitary groups. The document cites video evidence of 
government meetings to prevent the march from occurring and the building of roadblocks to 
prevent citizens from joining the march (1). Communications like this highlight the willingness 
of the MAS to use antidemocratic measures to achieve its vision. Oppressive measures like 
cutting power to indigenous areas at random and inciting angry mobs to attack protestors indicate 
a major turning point in how the MAS must be characterized.  
 Things further deteriorated with the actual consultation process, occurring from July to 
December 2012. While the MAS claimed the TIPNIS consultation process met the standards set 
forth by Law 222 and international conventions, verification reports made by the International 
Federation for Human Rights (FIDH) and the Permanent Assembly of Human Rights in Bolivia 
in conjunction with the Catholic Church (APDHB) contain heavy criticisms of the entire process.  
These groups found that the process was not performed in good faith. The verification mission 
intended to ensure the consultation met international law standards (APDHB and FIDH 2013, 4). 
The two groups visited 61% of communities involved in the consultation. Of 35 communities 
visited, only 19 were actually consulted by technicians from the state (4). Of consulted 
communities, some were given contradictory information.  
 A key convention in international law is the right to free, prior, informed consent as laid 
out in the UN Declaration of Human Rights and ILO Convention 169. The verification mission 
compendium states that there was nothing free, prior, or informed about the process, a sharp 
contrast to the rhetoric of the MAS. A “free” consultation process would mean a lack of 
coercion, but observing organizations found that criteria for decisions was imposed by state 
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technicians, and that the consultations took place within a “climate of confrontation and mutual 
distrust” (APDHB and FIDH 2013, 7). Location matters with consultation processes, and the 
government-dictated location meant that indigenous groups could not converse with their 
governments. Petty obstructions occurred, with the state denying fuel to the group TIPNIS 
Subcentral (7). Holding a community’s energy resources hostage in order to evoke positive 
responses cannot be considered a free process. The “prior” nature of consultation had long been 
violated, ever since the government decided to build the highway and signed legal agreements 
with Brazilian construction companies (6). Those decisions were made without any formal 
consultation process, so regardless of dialogue results, there was an open violation of FPIC 
principles. Lastly, the process was not “informed,” as dictated by Law 222 and other 
international conventions. Communities were not given all the information, particularly about the 
impacts of the road. Despite requests, indigenous communities reported never receiving an 
environmental impact report for the highway project (8). FPIC is an essential tool for indigenous 
groups to utilize to counter the state, but when states control the process, there is a high 
probability of an uneven playing field.  
 Much of the verification report centers around the term “untouchable” as used in the 2012 
consultation law. The MAS twisted definitions of intangibility to include not only physical use 
but access to social welfare programs. People were told that if the area was left “untouchable,” 
then welfare benefits could not and would not be extended to them (8). Other groups were 
warned that they could not ask for a total rejection of the road during the consultation (9). Such 
blatant manipulation of the consultation process shows the MAS’s willingness to violate human 
rights codes and its own constitution and legislation in pursuit of its modernist development 
strategy. The state’s inclination to eschew democratic norms leaves the indigenous movement 
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significantly weakened. When the state sets aside democratic processes to exert force, power 
dynamics are permanently altered at the expense of the more democratic actor, in this case, the 
indigenous population. 
Enduring Consequences 
The TIPNIS conflict demonstrates a functional convergence of all evaluative dimensions 
of the MAS. In the relentless pursuit of modernist developmentalism, the MAS has shown a 
strong willingness to use antidemocratic measures to achieve its vision. As of August 2018, the 
conflict continues: indigenous groups have called upon international institutions to intervene and 
dampen the MAS’s development acceleration. A 2018 report from the International Tribunal for 
the Rights of Nature found that the MAS had violated its own legal standing and international 
conventions, calling for a permanent halting of road construction due to the environmental threat 
it presents (Tribunal Internacional por los Derechos de la Naturaleza 2019, 25). The Tribunal 
uncovered extreme violations of the Universal Declaration of the Rights of Mother Earth, a 
convention that Bolivia had spearheaded at the World Peoples’ Conference on Climate Change 
and Rights of Mother Earth in Cochabamba in 2010. Even when MAS–indigenous alliances were 
strong, the MAS repudiated indigeneity behind the scenes, seeing it as a roadblock to 
development. Those whom they mobilized have now mobilized against them, with both actors 
deploying symbolic aspects of indigeneity in order to advance their interests. When it is 
necessary, the party performs sacred rituals and holds international conventions. This brings 
goodwill to the nation and places it at the forefront of radical, cutting-edge environmental legal 
innovation. Nevertheless, the MAS builds vague ethno-environmental appeals into legislation to 






This thesis has addressed the many frameworks available when analyzing former 
Bolivian president Evo Morales. Through the use of conjunctural analysis, I demonstrate how 
Morales and his party, the MAS, utilize elements of populism, resource nationalism, and ethno-
environmentalism. Although the MAS tries to make these three political strategies compatible, 
its handling of the TIPNIS conflict demonstrates the impossibility of that convergence. Morales 
and the party prioritize modernist developmentalist visions above all else, a fact their strategy 
attempts to hide. Rather than truly work with the indigenous communities Morales promotes 
symbolically, the party understands the relationship between indigenous communities and 
government to be transactional: they fund social welfare and keep the economy relatively stable, 
and in turn, indigenous communities mobilize votes for the party. In pursuit of delivering on 
social promises, the MAS imposes unpopular and sometimes antidemocratic measures. 
The TIPNIS conflict permanently marred the domestic trajectory and global perception of 
the MAS. The state’s interests evolved in such a way that key constituents not only disapproved 
of the party but key legislators shunned the party line. While the 2009 constitution and Law 71 
yielded some of the most environmentally-conscious legislation in the region and world, the 
state’s nearly immediate turn to infrastructure development was an obvious dismissal of the 
ideals promoted in those documents. Although indigenous protestors called on protective 
legislation, such as Law 71 and Law 180, the government used resource nationalism and an 
extractivist economic strategy to negate protestors’ claims. 
Morales, despite showing strong electoral popularity in his first three elections, began to 
falter in 2016 when he called a national referendum on the legality of his running for a fourth 
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presidential term. Although by close margins, the referendum did not go in his favor, with the 
“no vote” prevailing by a margin of 51.3% to 48.7% (Collyns and Watts 2016). Nevertheless, in 
November 2017, the Plurinational Constitutional Tribunal abolished term limits for elected 
officials and struck down the results of the 2016 referendum (Farthing 2017). Morales then 
asserted typical populist rhetoric, claiming imperialist outsiders created a smear campaign ahead 
of the referendum. In 2019, Morales was forced to resign from office on the heels of a major 
electoral controversy in which the Organization of American States (OAS) found “irregularities” 
in the October 2019 presidential election (Farthing and Arigho-Stiles 2019). In the wake of his 
resignation, anti-MAS conservative leader Jeanine Áñez took power as interim president. Áñez 
quickly showed hostility towards indigenous-identifying Bolivians, casting their beliefs as 
paganism and using the word “savage” to describe over half of her constituents (Forster 2020). 
She was determined to reverse many of the inclusionary measures taken by the MAS to celebrate 
ethnic diversity and environmental respect. Although the irregularities claimed by the OAS have 
since been disputed and the MAS has returned to power, the controversy encapsulated a 
tumultuous tenure for Morales. While he entered power as an outsider, by the end of his tenure 
key indigenous constituents had left the party, as the once political instrument of the masses had 
taken on too many establishment-style tendencies. 
Despite increased antidemocratic inclinations, Evo Morales and the MAS stand out in the 
ways they defy traditional classifications and provide a key point of comparison with other 
parties and social movements in the developing world. Inclusive campaigning and political 
rhetoric, as well as an internally democratic party structure allowed the MAS to eschew typical 
populist expectations and create a large base of ethnically diverse support. Evo Morales’ 
ethnopopulism fueled him to earn over half the votes in each of three elections, and only lost his 
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2016 referendum by a slim margin. Morales also connected grievances related to natural resource 
control to tangible policy commitments — a powerful strategy that funds a broad welfare 
program. His commitment to redistribution allowed him to solidify relationships with rural and 
indigenous communities that had been previously neglected by the state. While the extractivist 
model within a progressive state exists elsewhere, the indigenous demographic makeup of 
Bolivia further complicates the case. Morales had to provide for these vulnerable populations and 
listen to their demands while promoting a different ontological agenda in policy. Care for the 
natural environment and promotion of the rights of nature permeates the Bolivian political 
sphere, yet remains subordinate to the revenues of extractivism. 
Other academics analyze Bolivia in a siloed manner: as a case study in radical populism, 
a resource-rich country struggling to capitalize on its natural wealth, or as a predominantly 
indigenous nation. Still, the TIPNIS conflict demonstrates how these seemingly distinct elements 
of populism, resource nationalism, and ethno-environmentalism intersect. Studies of Bolivian 
populism often see resource nationalism as a distinct political strategy. They fail to note that 
resource nationalism exists not only as a policy commitment but as a facet of populist discourse. 
Likewise, indigeneity and ethno-environmentalism as a whole play a major role in Bolivian 
populism, and is asserted in resource nationalist discourse. Examining these three elements in an 
integrative framework refutes singular narratives of Evo Morales and the MAS. An integrated 
analytical approach gives a more holistic account of Bolivian politics and provides a comparative 







Timeline of Key Events 
1952 National Revolutionary Movement (MNR) comes to power 
1985 New Economic Policy by MNR, liberalization begins 
1986 National tin mines close, leading unemployed migrants to move to 
Cochabamba 
1980s War on Drugs, Ley 1008 promotes coca eradication programs  
1990 First Indigenous March for Territory and Dignity 
1994 Law of Popular Participation, Decentralization Law 
1996 Hydrocarbons Law 1689: Privatized oil and gas industries 
1999 First elections with the MAS as a viable party option 
2000 Water War in Cochabamba resulting from raised water prices 
2002 Unity Pact between CSUTCB, CIDOB, Bartolina Sisa, CONAMAQ, 
CSCIB formed 
2003–2005 Both President Sánchez de Lozada and successor Carlos Mesa resign 
in the midst of protests over rising energy prices and plans to export 
natural gas 
2005 December The Movement Towards Socialism wins both the Presidency and 
majority in congress. Led by Evo Morales winning 53.7% of the 
votes 
2006 May 1 Nationalization of the hydrocarbon industry, refounding the YPFB: 
Supreme Decree 28701 
2008 Morales signs construction contract signed for 306 km highway, to 
be completed in three sections 
2008 September US Ambassador expelled from Bolivia 




2009 January New Constitution of the Plurinational State of Bolivia adopted, 
upholding MAS campaign promise 
2010 Morales wins second presidential election, retaining immense 
popularity and earning 64.22% of the vote 
2010 April World Peoples’ Conference on Climate Change and the Rights of 
Mother Earth in Cochabamba adopts the Universal Declaration of the 
Rights of Mother Earth 
2010 May Nationalization of electricity firms 
2010 December Law 71 on the Rights of Mother Earth 
2011 January Loan agreement signed with BNDES for $332 million, for a total 
project cost of $415 million 
2011 May Morales proposes the highway connecting Villa Tunari and San 
Ignacio de Moxos through the TIPNIS 
2011 August 8th Indigenous March from TIPNIS to La Paz begins 
2011 September Violent oppression of protestors by police force at Chaparina 
2011 October Morales signs Law 180, effectively banning TIPNIS highway 
construction and deeming area “untouchable”  
2011 December CIDOB and CONAMAQ split from Unity Pact, internal divisions 
deepen in each organization 
2011 December Countermarch from CONISUR 
2012 January Indigenous leaders form own voting bloc, splitting with the MAS 
2012 February Law 222 dictates the implementation of a consultation process for 
development in the TIPNIS 
2012 April Ninth Indigenous March  




2012 May Morales clears way for a fourth term; ruling states that term served 
under old Constitution does not count towards new term limits 
2012 July–December Consultation occurs, bringing immense criticism 
2012 October Law 300: Framework Law of Mother Earth and Integral 
Development for Living Well 
2013  United States Agency for International Development (USAID) 
expelled 
2014 Morales wins third presidential election with 61.36% of votes 
2016 Constitutional referendum on legality of a fourth term for Morales 
loses, 51%–49% 
2017 August Repeal of Law 180, replaced by Law 969 opening the way for the 
development project in the TIPNIS once more 
2017 November The Plurinational Constitutional Tribunal abolishes term limits for all 
elected officials, paving the way for Morales to run for a fourth term 
2017 November International Tribunal on the Rights of Nature visits Bolivia 
2019 October Morales ousted as a result of election audit by the Organization of 
American States 
2020  MAS democratically retains majority in new election with victory by 
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